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THE UNDERMINING INFLUENCE OF THE 
FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY ON CAPITAL 
POLICYMAKING AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
ADMINISTRATION IN THE STATES 
EILEEN M. CONNOR* 
This Article investigates the dynamic relationship between the federal 
death penalty and the administration of criminal justice and capital 
sentencing in the states.  As currently administered, the federal death 
penalty is used to attain death sentences against defendants in states where 
the death penalty is not available, where the state prosecution has resulted 
in a sentence less than death, or where a state death sentence has been 
overturned on appeal.  The author argues that this practice obstructs the 
ability of, and obscures the incentives for, individual states to set criminal 
justice policy within their respective territorial jurisdictions, and 
furthermore that this tendency is manifestly out of step with constitutional 
norms surrounding the death penalty.  Examining the constitutional 
doctrines of the Commerce Clause, double jeopardy, equal protection, and 
the Sixth Amendment, the author finds that none offers a meaningful 
limitation on the operation of the federal death penalty where dual 
jurisdiction exists.  The differing experiences of the federal government and 
several states with determinate sentencing systems are used to expose the 
institutional features that act as limitations on the ability of Congress to set 
criminal justice policy.  States are currently reexamining the use of capital 
punishment in the face of rising costs, increasing budget deficits, and 
concerns about the fair administration of the death penalty.  In contrast, the 
federal government, which does not possess a general police power and is 
not the primary enforcer of criminal law, is insensitive to cost and unlikely 
to engage in meaningful debate regarding the rationale for capital 
punishment.  Furthermore, the current use of the federal death penalty as a 
 
* John J. Gibbons Fellow in Public Interest and Constitutional Law, Gibbons P.C.  The 
views expressed herein are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of 
her employer.  The author wishes to acknowledge the careful and thoughtful assistance of 
the editors and staff at the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, which has contributed 
greatly to this article. 
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backstop to state sentencing regimes is out of step with constitutional 
principles governing capital sentencing.  In addition to creating the 
potential for unfairness to individual defendants, the presence of the federal 
death penalty undermines state actors from legislators to district attorneys 
and jurors.  The author concludes that a due regard for the primary role of 
the states in criminal justice administration suggests that federal restraint, 
in the form of a statutory adoption of a rule akin to the Department of 
Justice’s current “Petite Policy,” is in order. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When Ronell Wilson was sentenced to death by a federal judge in the 
Eastern District of New York in March of 2007,1 it was the first federal 
death sentence obtained in New York City in over fifty years.2  Wilson was 
originally charged with capital murder in state court,3 but after New York’s 
high court invalidated the state’s death penalty in 2004,4 the Staten Island 
District Attorney requested that federal prosecutors take over the case.5  The 
federal interest in the case was not obvious—Wilson was accused of 
murdering two undercover New York City Police Department officers 
investigating an illegal weapons ring in Staten Island.  The investigation 
was not part of a joint federal-state task force, and the murder case was 
investigated by local law enforcement, and cooperating witnesses were 
given deals in state, not federal court.6  The clear motivation for the transfer 
was that the death penalty was not available in state court. 
Unsurprisingly, the decision of the Staten Island district attorney to 
seek the death penalty against Wilson was widely supported by the local 
law enforcement community,7 who were a visible presence at the federal 
 
1 Wilson was tried before and sentenced by Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis.  United States v. 
Wilson, 493 F. Supp. 2d 537 (E.D.N.Y. 2007). 
2 Michael Brick, Jury Agrees on Death Sentence for the Killer of Two Detectives, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 31, 2007, at A1.  At least fourteen defendants had faced the federal death penalty 
in the city since its reintroduction.  Id. 
3 Shaila K. Dewan, Death Penalty to Be Sought in the Killing of Two Detectives, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 2003, at B2. 
4 People v. LaValle, 817 N.E.2d 341, 367-69 (N.Y. 2004) (holding that unconstitutional 
jury instruction rendered statutory scheme invalid absent legislative amendment). 
5 Michele Morgan Bolton, Killer’s Sentence Sparks a Debate, TIMES UNION (Albany, 
N.Y.), Feb. 1, 2007, at A1. 
6 Jeff Harrell, For 2 Who Helped Nail Cop Killer, Minimum Sentences, STATEN ISLAND 
ADVANCE, May 9, 2007, at A4 (reporting state sentences of Jessie Jacobus and Mitchell 
Diaz). 
7 See Daryl Khan, Cops Hail DA’s Death Decision, NEWSDAY (Queens), July 31, 2003, 
at A7, available at 2003 WLNR 930263 (“When the hearing was over and Ronell Wilson 
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trial.8  Critics characterized the federal prosecution as an “end run” around 
the New York law,9 whereas others saw the federal capital trial as 
expressing the conscience of the community where the laws of the state 
failed to adequately provide for such expression.10  When the federal jury, 
which was drawn from a geographical area including but not limited to 
Staten Island,11 returned a death verdict, Staten Island Borough President 
James Molinaro commended the decision and opined that “[t]he vast 
majority of New Yorkers support capital punishment for the most heinous 
acts of murder.”12 
As Wilson and other cases demonstrate, capital punishment gives rise 
to tensions between federal and state values.  Increases in the quantity and 
scope of federal criminal legislation enacted pursuant to the Commerce 
Clause have made federal law nearly coextensive with state law such that 
virtually every murder may be charged by both authorities.  The death 
penalty is available very broadly under federal law, whereas in some states 
it is not available, not imposed, or more difficult to obtain when sought.  In 
practice, the number of federal capital prosecutions remains low, and the 
vast majority of homicide prosecutions are undertaken by state criminal 
justice systems.13  However, the impact of the federal death penalty is 
 
knew for certain he was potentially facing the death penalty, . . . applause erupted from the 
roughly 40 police officers, detectives and family members who had gathered to pay 
witness.”). 
8 See John Marzuli, Judge Nixes NYPD Blue at Trial of Accused Cop Killer, N.Y. DAILY 
NEWS, Oct. 5, 2006, at 8 (reporting ruling of Judge Garaufis banning uniformed police 
officers from courtroom). 
9 Michelle M. Bolton, Killer’s Sentence Sparks a Debate: Death Penalty Foes Say 
Prosecutors in Police Murders Ducked Law, TIMES UNION (Albany, NY), Feb. 1, 2007, at 
A1. 
10 See Editorial, Justice for Slain Heroes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Mar. 30, 2007, at 34 
(characterizing Wilson’s crime as “precisely the type of crime that the death penalty is meant 
to address” and noting that because of “the failure of the New York Legislature to repair 
New York’s capital punishment statute—which it could easily do—the only place such 
crimes can be properly addressed is in federal court”). 
11 The U.S. Attorney characterized the federal jury as “from this community.”  Brick, 
supra note 2. 
12 Office of the Borough President, Staten Island, B.P. Molinaro Commends Brooklyn 
Federal Jury on Capital Punishment for Ronell Wilson (Feb. 1, 2007), available at 
http://statenislandusa.com/2007/wilson.html. 
13 The most recent statistics made available by the federal government indicate that 
federal prosecutors investigated 661 murder suspects in 2005.  See MARK MOTIVANS, 
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2005—
STATISTICAL TABLES tbl.2.1 (2008), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/html/ 
fjsst/2005/tables/fjs05st201.htm.  The Federal Bureau of Investigation estimates the number 
of homicides committed in the United States at large for that year at 16,692.  See FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES 2005 tbl.1 
(2006), http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/05cius/data/table_01.html.  Thus, the federal government 
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greater than these numbers suggest, as the potential for federal prosecution 
alters the behavior of state-level criminal justice actors in a number of 
ways. 
An abundance of scholarship addresses the consequences of increased 
federal criminal jurisdiction on local actors and individual criminal 
defendants.  Likewise, an enormous body of literature examines the 
constitutional underpinnings and attributes of the modern death penalty 
regime.  However, little attention has been paid to the dynamic relationship 
between federal criminal law in general, the federal death penalty, and the 
administration of criminal justice and capital sentencing in the states. 
This Article addresses this dynamic relationship and argues that the 
federal death penalty obstructs the ability of and obscures the incentives for 
individual states to set criminal justice policy within their respective 
territorial jurisdictions, and furthermore that this tendency is manifestly out 
of step with constitutional norms surrounding the death penalty.  Part II.A 
provides an overview of the current federal death penalty and the policy of 
the Department of Justice, which guides the use of prosecutorial discretion 
in relation to concurrent federal-state jurisdiction in homicide cases.  Part 
II.B details a selection of recent federal cases, which suggest that federal 
prosecutions are being undertaken not to vindicate uniquely federal 
interests, but rather to achieve death sentences where the state prosecution 
would yield, at a maximum, a sentence of life imprisonment without the 
possibility of parole.  At times, federal prosecutions are undertaken at the 
behest of state and local authorities, and at other times, they are in conflict 
with local norms.  Part III examines several constitutional doctrines and 
finds that they are insufficient to resolve the individual rights and sovereign 
interests implicated by certain federal death penalty prosecutions.  In 
particular, jurisprudence under the Double Jeopardy Clause recognizes the 
dual sovereignty doctrine, by which successive federal-state prosecutions 
are permissible.  In the capital context, this means that a defendant may be 
acquitted or sentenced to life in state court and then prosecuted capitally by 
federal authorities.  Although dual criminal jurisdiction is an enduring 
component of our federal system, the present calibration of federal criminal 
power vis-à-vis the states is predicated on an outdated norm that assigns to 
 
was involved in the investigation (although not necessarily the prosecution) of less than 4% 
of all murders in the United States for that year.  The United States Department of Justice 
concurs that “the vast majority of homicides in the Untied [sic] States, like most violent 
crimes, are investigated exclusively by local police officers working hand-in-hand with local 
prosecutors, who file charges against defendants in state courts.”  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: A STATISTICAL SURVEY 1988-2000 4 (2000), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/pubdoc/dpsurvey.html [hereinafter DOJ STATISTICAL 
SURVEY]. 
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states obstructionist intentions with respect to federal law enforcement 
priorities.  However, the modern landscape is one of collaboration.  Part IV 
examines the institutional features of Congress that impact its capacity to 
enact rational criminal justice legislation and argues that the respective 
states are better able to set a rational criminal justice policy that is truly 
reflective of community norms.  Part V argues that the overlapping 
jurisdiction of federal and state death penalty law is inconsistent with 
constitutional principles governing capital sentencing.  The potential for 
federal capital prosecution nationwide threatens to undermine seriously the 
ability of states to make reasoned policy choices for the benefit of their 
citizenry, the ability of local prosecutors to remain accountable for their 
charging decisions, and the capacity of local juries to breathe normative and 
moral values into the substance of capital law.  Finally, Part VI suggests 
that federal enactment of an abstention rule similar to the non-binding 
policy currently operative within the Department of Justice is the best 
means to address the concerns raised in Part V. 
II.  THE SUBSTANTIAL FEDERAL INTEREST IN THE DEATH PENALTY 
The federal government has in recent years broadened the reach of its 
capital punishment regime.14  This expansion, as discussed infra, is 
attributable to an increase in federal statutes authorizing the death penalty 
for particular crimes and, in part, an increased willingness on the part of 
recent Attorneys General to pursue federal capital prosecutions. 
The policy considerations facing Congress and federal law 
enforcement officials are quite distinct from those that impact the states.  In 
addition to the need to consider how to best vindicate federal interests and 
effectuate national law enforcement policy, the federal government must 
consider that its criminal jurisdiction often overlaps with that of the states.  
Part II.A provides a brief overview of federal statutory law regarding the 
death penalty and outlines the Department of Justice’s internal procedures 
regarding which cases will be selected for capital prosecution.  Part II.B 
provides examples of recent capital prosecutions in which federal 
prosecution overlapped and, at times, conflicted with state criminal 
jurisdiction, and argues that the Department’s procedures do not provide a 
clear principle for resolving these conflicts. 
 
14 Between 1988, the year in which the federal death penalty was reintroduced, and 1994, 
the federal government initiated forty-seven capital prosecutions.  DOJ STATISTICAL SURVEY, 
supra note 13, at 8.  Between 1995 and 2000, that number grew to 159.  Id. 
154 EILEEN M. CONNOR [Vol. 100 
A.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE FEDERAL STATUTES AND POLICY 
GOVERNING THE DEATH PENALTY 
The increasing frequency of federal capital prosecutions and expansion 
of death-eligible offenses under federal law is in line with the well-
documented, expansive trend in general federal criminal law.15  
Commentators have explored the implications of this expansion for the 
calibration of power in our federalist system.16  Prior to the last third of the 
twentieth century, the bulk of federal criminal law was directed at conduct 
that was particularly or inherently federal in nature—crimes against the 
sovereignty of the federal government, such as treason, and crimes 
involving national currency, borders, land, or territories.17  Almost by 
definition, the conduct proscribed in a truly national crime was beyond the 
reach of state criminal statutes or enforcement capabilities.  This 
arrangement was in harmony with fundamental precepts regarding the 
balance of power between the constituent parts of our federal system.  
Traditionally, states are the protectors of the public health and welfare of 
their citizens, whereas the Constitution did not grant to the federal 
government a general police power.18  Yet given the current expanded 
 
15 See generally AM. BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW, 
THE FEDERALIZATION OF CRIMINAL LAW 5 (1998) [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT]; 
Gerald G. Ashdown, Federalism, Federalization, and the Politics of Crime, 98 W. VA. L. 
REV. 789 (1996); Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and Yet Too Few: New Principles to Define the 
Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979 (1995). 
16 See, e.g., ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 5 (“The fundamental view that 
local crime is, with rare exception, a matter for the states to attack has been strained in 
practice in recent years.  Congressional activity making essentially local conduct a federal 
crime has accelerated greatly, notably in areas in which existing state law already 
criminalizes the same conduct.”); Ashdown, supra note 15, at 813 ( “Wholesale federal 
criminalization and enforcement of local crime heads the country in the direction that the 
framers of the Constitution wanted to avoid—the creation of a strong and pervasive national 
police and criminal justice system.”); Beale, supra note 15, at 993 (“The current increase in 
federal criminal jurisdiction is in fundamental tension with the values of decentralization 
promoted by federalism.”). 
17 See ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 46 (detailing typical federal criminal 
legislation that addresses “crimes interfering with the core functions of the federal 
government: treason, controlling national borders, and protecting government currency” and 
legislation “based on a federal relationship to the site of the crime”). 
18 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) (“[T]he Constitution . . . 
withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power.”); Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 
635 (1993) (explaining that in our federal system, “[t]he States possess primary authority for 
defining and enforcing the criminal law”) (quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 
(1982)); Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201 (1977) (“It goes without saying that 
preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business of the States than it is of the 
Federal Government.”); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 109 (1945) (plurality opinion) 
(“Our national government is one of delegated powers alone. . . .  [T]he administration of 
criminal justice rests with the States except as Congress, acting within the scope of [its] 
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scope of federal criminal law, this precept is observed more often in the 
breach, as courts have upheld federal criminal statute upon federal criminal 
statute as valid exercises of Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause.19  A consequence of this expanded and expansive federal criminal 
jurisdiction is that virtually every homicide is potentially punishable by the 
federal government, even those that are purely local and thus seemingly at 
the core of the quintessential local police power.20 
Three federal legislative enactments compose the modern federal death 
penalty.  Following the Supreme Court’s invalidation of all death penalty 
statutes in Furman v. Georgia in 1972,21 the United States did not reinstate 
the death penalty for federal offenses until 1988 with the passage of the 
Anti-Drug Abuse Act.22  The availability of the federal death penalty 
expanded further with the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act 
of 1994, which contained the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA).23  The 
FDPA prescribes procedures for implementing the death penalty in relation 
to over sixty substantive crimes.24  The Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
 
delegated powers, has created offenses against the United States.”); cf. United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 584 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing that reading the Commerce Clause 
to allow Congress to regulate intrastate, noncommercial activity would confer upon 
Congress a general police power). 
19 See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 41 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring) (voting to 
uphold a portion of the Controlled Substances Act that criminalizes the growing of 
marijuana for personal consumption against a Commerce Clause challenge while affirming 
the principle that Congress may not regulate purely local activity); United States v. Patton, 
451 F.3d 615 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding federal law prohibiting felons from possessing 
body armor); United States v. Grimmett, 439 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding federal 
prohibition on intrastate possession of child pornography). 
20 See, e.g., United States v. Claiborne, 92 F. Supp. 2d 503, 509 (E.D. Va. 2000) (“[T]he 
Commerce Clause has been broadly expanded and the line between federal and state crimes 
has been blurred to allow virtually every crime to be prosecuted in federal court under the 
auspice of ‘affecting interstate commerce.’”); accord Bob Egelko, S.F. Grapples with 1st 
Death Trials in Years, S.F. CHRON. Mar. 1, 2009, at B1 (quoting former federal prosecutor 
Rory Little as saying: “[t]here’s no case where there’s a homicide that you couldn’t charge 
as a federal death penalty if you worked hard enough.”). 
21 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
22 Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (codified as 
amended at scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (2006)).  The Act made the crime of “continuing 
criminal enterprise” death-eligible.  See 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2006). 
23 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3599 (2006). 
24 A non-exhaustive list of the federal crimes that carry the death penalty include murder 
related to the smuggling of aliens, 8 U.S.C § 1342 (2006); destruction of an aircraft, motor 
vehicle, or related facilities resulting in death, 18 U.S.C. §§ 32-34 (2006); murder committed 
during a drug-related drive-by shooting, 18 U.S.C. § 36 (2006); retaliatory murder of a 
member of the immediate family of law enforcement officials, 18 U.S.C. § 115(b)(3) (2006) 
(cross referencing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1111, 1113, 1117 (2006)); civil rights offenses resulting in 
death, 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 245, 247 (2006); death resulting from offenses involving 
transportation of explosives, destruction of government property related to foreign or 
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Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) added four more crimes to the list of death-
eligible federal offenses.25  It cannot be said that the majority of these 
crimes reach criminal conduct directed against the United States as an 
entity, nor can it be said that the substantive crimes describe behavior that is 
not proscribed by the criminal codes of each of the fifty states.  For 
example, among the most frequently charged federal capital crimes are the 
use of a gun to commit homicide during and in relation to a crime of 
violence or drug trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), murder in aid 
of racketeering activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a), and murder in 
furtherance of a continuing criminal narcotics enterprise in violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 848(e)(1)(A)—all targeting conduct proscribed by every state.26 
That the federal government has the ability to prosecute virtually every 
homicide in the United States as a capital crime does not, of course, mean 
that it does or will, or that the states have been supplanted as the primary 
prosecutors of human-on-human violence.27  Since 1988, the Attorney 
General of the United States has authorized capital prosecutions against 441 
defendants.28  This number represents a tiny fraction of cases in which the 
federal government could assert its criminal jurisdiction and charge an 
offense that carries the death penalty. 
 
interstate commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 844(d), (f), (i) (2006); murder committed by the use of a 
firearm during a crime of violence or a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(5)(B)(i) 
(2006); first-degree murder, 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (2006); murder of a foreign official, official 
guest, or internationally protected person, 18 U.S.C. § 1116 (2006); murder by a federal 
prisoner, 18 U.S.C. § 1118 (2006); murder of a state or local law enforcement official or 
other person aiding in a federal investigation or murder of a state correctional officer, 18 
U.S.C. § 1121 (2006); murder during a kidnapping, 18 U.S.C § 1201 (2006); murder during 
a hostage taking, 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006); mailing of injurious articles with intent to kill or 
resulting in death, 18 U.S.C. § 1716 (2006); use of interstate commerce facilities in the 
commission of murder for hire, 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2006); bank-robbery-related murder or 
kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. § 2113 (2006); murder in aid of racketeering activity, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1959 (2006); murder related to a carjacking, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006); murder related to a 
rape or child molestation, 18 U.S.C. § 2245 (2006); murder committed during an offense 
against maritime navigation, 18 U.S.C. § 2280 (2006); murder by the use of a weapon of 
mass destruction, 18 U.S.C. § 2332a (2006); murder involving torture, 18 U.S.C. § 2340A 
(2006); and murder related to a continuing criminal enterprise or related murder of a federal, 
state, or local law enforcement official, 21 U.S.C. § 848(e) (2006).  Non-homicide capital 
crimes include espionage, 18 U.S.C. § 794 (2006); treason, 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (2006); and 
trafficking in large quantities of drugs, 18 U.S.C. § 3591(b) (2006).  
25 See DOJ STATISTICAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 1. 
26 See id. at 13. 
27 See supra note 13. 
28 Current information on the charging practices of the federal government may be found 
on the Death Penalty Information Center website.  Death Penalty Information Center, 
Federal Death Penalty, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/federal-death-penalty (last visited 
Nov. 11, 2009). 
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One factor acting as a restraint on the number of federal criminal 
prosecutions is the Department of Justice’s centralized review process.  
Unlike state-level county prosecutors, the United States Attorneys of the 
ninety-three judicial districts spanning the fifty states, Puerto Rico, Guam, 
the Virgin Islands, and the Northern Mariana Islands are not autonomous 
actors when it comes to capital prosecutions.  Should a United States 
Attorney wish to prosecute a defendant capitally, he or she must submit a 
memorandum to the Attorney General’s Review Committee on Capital 
Cases (known as the Capital Review Committee).  The Attorney General 
makes the final decision about whether to seek the death penalty,29 and once 
the Capital Review Committee has authorized a capital prosecution, the 
United States Attorney must seek permission from the Attorney General to 
reduce the charges.30  The ultimate decision rests with the Attorney General, 
who may override the local prosecutor’s preference.31 
An express goal of this centralized authorization policy is to achieve 
uniformity in charging decisions across jurisdictions: 
National consistency requires treating similar cases similarly, when the only material 
difference is the location of the crime.  Reviewers in each district are understandably 
most familiar with local norms or practice in their district and State, but reviewers 
must also take care to contextualize a given case within national norms or practice.32 
Thus, department policy requires that each decision to seek or not to seek 
the death penalty “be set within a framework of consistent and even-handed 
national application of Federal capital sentencing laws.”33  The Capital 
Review Committee is populated with an eye toward national uniformity.  
According to departmental testimony presented to the United States Senate: 
“The Committee members were selected based on their abilities to 
 
29 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-10.040 (2007), 
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam [hereinafter 
USAM].  
30 Id. § 9-10.150 (“Once the Attorney General has authorized the United States Attorney 
to seek the death penalty, the United States Attorney may not withdraw a notice of intention 
to seek the death penalty filed with the district court unless authorized by the Attorney 
General.”). 
31 Id. § 9-10.150 (“The United States Attorney should base the withdrawal request on 
material changes in the facts and circumstances of the case from those that existed at the 
time of the initial determination . . . .  In all cases, the Attorney General shall make the final 
decision on whether to authorize the withdrawal of a notice of intention to seek the death 
penalty.”). 
32 Id. § 9-10.130.B. 
33 Id. § 9-10.030. 
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synthesize facts and to fairly and uniformly evaluate arguments regarding 
the application of the Federal death penalty statutes.”34 
Uniformity and consistency in capital charging decisions are laudable 
goals, especially given that modern death penalty jurisprudence posits 
arbitrariness as the chief vice against which the Eighth Amendment 
guards.35  The virtue of the Capital Review Committee is that by allowing 
the same group of individuals to review and issue recommendations on 
most potentially capital federal cases,36 some consistency may be achieved.  
Yet, aside from this procedure, the substantive values by which the 
committee makes its determinations are under-articulated,37 especially in 
light of the expanse of territory and citizenry over which the Department 
presides and the virtually unlimited scope of federal criminal jurisdiction.  
The Department concedes that “Federal law enforcement resources and 
Federal judicial resources are not sufficient to permit prosecution of every 
alleged offense over which Federal jurisdiction exists.”38 
A separate policy relating to dual state and federal jurisdiction 
provides some further principles.  Departmental policy dictates that scarce 
federal resources are not to be expended where state law targets federally 
proscribed conduct and enforcement of state law is thorough and effective.39  
In such instances of overlapping jurisdiction, a federal prosecution should 
 
34 See Oversight of the Federal Death Penalty: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Const. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 38-62 (2007) [hereinafter Federal 
Death Penalty Hearing] (responses of Department of Justice to questions submitted by 
Senator Feingold).  
35 The concern over arbitrariness led the Supreme Court to find Georgia’s capital 
punishment statute unconstitutional in Furman v. Georgia.  408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that 
being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual . . . .  [T]he Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of death under legal systems that 
permit this unique penalty to be so wantonly and freakishly imposed.”); Id. at 313 (White, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he death penalty is exacted with great infrequency even for the most 
atrocious of crimes . . . .  There is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in 
which it is imposed from the many in which it is not.”); Id. at 249 (Douglas, J., concurring) 
(“A penalty . . . should be considered ‘unusually’ imposed if it is administered arbitrarily or 
discriminatorily.”). 
36 Before issuing an indictment in a case potentially subject to the death penalty (even 
where the indictment will be for a lesser offense, or where the death penalty is not sought), 
“the United States Attorney is strongly advised, but not required, to consult with the Capital 
Case unit.”  USAM, supra note 29, § 9-10.050. 
37 See John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment: Why the Attorney 
General Should Defer when U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against the Death Penalty, 89 VA. 
L. REV. 1697, 1698-99 (2003) (gleaning general principles by which the Attorney General 
requires U.S. Attorneys to seek death in the absence of formal statement of standards). 
38 USAM, supra note 29, § 9-27.230.B.1. 
39 Id. § 9-27.220.A.2. 
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be undertaken “only when the Federal interest in the prosecution is more 
substantial than the interests of the State or local authorities.”40  The interest 
of the state in prosecution of the offense is indicated in the nature of the 
offense, identity of the offender or victim, and the amount of investigative 
resources already devoted by the state.41  The federal interest may be 
heightened where the criminal activity reached beyond the boundaries of a 
single local prosecutorial jurisdiction42 and where the “ability and 
willingness of the State to prosecute effectively and obtain an appropriate 
punishment upon conviction” is lacking.43 
The policy supports federal prosecution where a state is unlikely to 
obtain an “appropriate punishment.”  What exactly is considered to be 
appropriate punishment is not defined, but by inference, this phrase must 
relate to the severity of the sentence.  Because federal prosecution aimed at 
correcting a state sentence deemed inappropriate for its severity would be 
an absurd use of resources and ultimately inconsequential—since the more 
lenient federal punishment will not prevent the state from executing its 
sentence—the import of the policy is that federal prosecutions are utilized 
when the array of potential state sentences is deemed too lenient. 
The concept of “appropriate punishment” is mirrored in the 
Department’s policy regarding successive federal-state prosecutions.  
Because the Double Jeopardy Clause allows a federal prosecution following 
a state prosecution,44 the federal government may initiate a second 
prosecution in order to vindicate a substantial federal interest.  Such 
prosecutions are governed by a second discretionary policy, the “Petite 
Policy.”45  The purposes of this policy are (1) to “protect persons charged 
with criminal conduct from the burdens associated with multiple 
prosecutions or punishments for substantially the same act(s) or 
transaction(s)”; (2) to allow for the “vindicat[ion] of substantial federal 
interests through appropriate federal prosecutions”; (3) to promote efficient 
use of departmental resources; and (4) to facilitate federal-state cooperation 
in law enforcement.46  The policy requires the prior approval of the 
Attorney General “whenever there has been a prior state or federal 
prosecution resulting in an acquittal, a conviction, including one resulting 
from a plea agreement, or a dismissal or other termination of the case on the 
 
40 Id. § 9-10.090. 
41 See id. § 9-10.090.A. 
42 Id. § 9-10.090.B. 
43 Id. § 9-10.090.C. 
44 See infra Part III.B. 
45 USAM, supra note 29, § 9-2.031. 
46 See id. § 9-2.031.A. 
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merits after jeopardy has attached.”47  Approval is contingent upon the 
satisfaction of three prerequisites: 
[F]irst, the matter must involve a substantial federal interest; second, the prior 
prosecution must have left that interest demonstrably unvindicated; and third, 
applying the same test that is applicable to all federal prosecutions, the government 
must believe that the defendant’s conduct constitutes a federal offense, and that the 
admissible evidence probably will be sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction.48 
Although the charging policy speaks of uniformity, this is in tension 
with the admittedly limited resources of the federal government and indeed 
with the empirical reality of federal criminal prosecutions.  Both the capital 
charging policy and the Petite Policy imply that a state is capable of 
delivering full vindication of federal interests, so long as punishment is 
sufficiently severe.  Where state laws, policies, or norms favor the same or 
greater level of punishment for a certain crime, the local norm is observed, 
either by virtue of a federal prosecution whose sentencing outcome is 
similar to that which would be attained in a state prosecution, or, more 
likely, by federal abstention from prosecution.  Where state laws, policies, 
or norms favor less punishment, the norm may be supplanted by a 
successive or overriding federal prosecution. 
B.  EXAMPLES OF FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS 
The existence of dual jurisdiction over potentially capital crimes raises 
questions about the exact parameters of “appropriate punishment” and the 
existence of a “substantial federal interest” in obtaining a particular 
sentencing outcome.  Some examples of the application of the Department’s 
policies in actual cases suggest that in certain instances, in the judgment of 
the Department, the only appropriate punishment is a death sentence, 
without which the substantial federal interest would be unvindicated. 
1.  Prosecutions Initiated in Federal Court Where the Death Penalty Is 
Unavailable in the State 
The federal prosecution of Alan Quinones predated the Ronell Wilson 
trial, discussed supra, but was similar in several respects.  Quinones was 
accused of murdering an undercover New York City Police Department 
(NYPD) officer in the Bronx.49  Although Quinones’s criminal behavior fit 
within the federal charge of murder in furtherance of a continuing criminal 
enterprise, the crime was arguably local: he was a relatively small-time drug 
dealer; the victim was part of an NYPD investigative team; the murder was 
 
47 Id. § 9-2.031.C. 
48 Id. § 9-2.031.A. 
49 United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 292 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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in retaliation for an arrest by the NYPD; the murder took place in the Bronx 
and was investigated by the NYPD.  Capital punishment was (at the time) 
available in New York, but the Bronx District Attorney, Robert Johnson, 
has a policy of not seeking the death penalty.50  As Johnson is the longest 
serving district attorney in Bronx history,51 this policy evidently meets with 
local approval, although at times it has been challenged by higher state 
authorities.  The Governor of New York had successfully removed Johnson 
from the trial of another defendant accused of killing an officer of the 
NYPD.52  By removing the matter from Johnson’s control, the federal 
charges against Quinones obviated the need for a similar political scuffle.  
Although the United States Attorney recommended against seeking the 
death penalty in the case, the United States Attorney General overrode this 
recommendation.53  The Justice Department pursued the capital charge, it 
said, in order to ensure consistency of capital punishment across the 
country.54  The federal jury convicted Quinones, but he was given only a 
life sentence.55 
A federal forum afforded the option of a death sentence for Alfonso 
Rodriguez, Jr., who was convicted and sentenced to death by a federal jury 
in the District of North Dakota.56  The crime had been sensationalized in the 
national media; Rodriguez, a convicted sex offender recently released from 
prison, was convicted of killing a vivacious white college student whom he 
 
50 Johnson issued a statement in 1995, upon legislative authorization of the death penalty 
in New York, declaring his intention not to utilize the death penalty.  His reasons included 
the fact that, while the “probability of conviction and certainty of punishment” are the best 
deterrents of crime, the death penalty is never certain in a given case and therefore resources 
are better spent in other criminal justice endeavors.  Robert Johnson, Bronx District 
Attorney, Statement Regarding New Death Penalty/Life Without Parole Law in New York 
State (Mar. 7, 1995), http://bronxda.nyc.gov/fcrime/death.htm. 
51 See Bronx District Attorney’s Office, District Attorney’s Biography, 
http://bronxda.nyc.gov (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). 
52 See In re Johnson v. Pataki, 691 N.E. 2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1997).  Johnson called 
Governor Pataki’s action “tantamount to the disenfranchisement of the voters of the Bronx.”  
Letter from Robert Johnson, Bronx District Attorney, to George Pataki, Governor of New 
York (Mar. 20, 1996), available at http://bronxda.nyc.gov/fcrime/death.htm#1g. 
53 Julia Preston, Killers Get Life Sentences in Setback to Justice Department, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 6, 2004, at B2. 
54 Id. (“Justice officials have said they are bringing more capital charges in the New 
York region to ensure consistency of capital punishment across the country.  No jury has 
delivered a federal death penalty sentence in New York State since the penalty was 
reinstated in 1988.”). 
55 See United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 291 (2d Cir. 2007). 
56 United States v. Rodriquez, No. 2:04-cr-55, 2007 WL 466752, at *52 (D. N.D. Feb. 
12, 2007). 
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had kidnapped from a mall parking lot.57  It was the first death sentence 
handed down within the territorial jurisdiction of that state in nearly one 
hundred years.58  Similarly, in 2005 Donald Fell received a federal death 
sentence for a crime that partially took place in Vermont,59 a state without 
the death penalty.60  Notably, Fell was tried only after the Attorney General 
rejected his plea agreement with the United States Attorney’s Office for the 
District of Vermont.61  His death sentence was the first one delivered by a 
jury in Vermont in nearly fifty years.62 
2.  Simultaneous State and Federal Prosecutions 
In Tennessee, two brothers, Robert and Antonio Carpenter, faced dual 
murder prosecutions in state and federal court, stemming from the 
abduction and murder of a local woman from a fast-food restaurant drive-in 
in 1999.63  Federal authorities charged the brothers under the federal 
carjacking statute.64  In what was, at the time, a rare occurrence, the United 
States Attorney General authorized federal prosecutors to seek the death 
penalty against the Carpenter brothers, despite the fact that they were 
presently facing the death penalty in state court.65  However, the state 
prosecution was on uncertain grounds.  Defense attorneys for the Carpenter 
brothers, who are African-American, filed a motion to dismiss the capital 
charges, predicated on the assertion that District Attorney Elizabeth Rice 
engaged in a pattern and practice of racial discrimination in seeking the 
 
57 See Dave Kolpack, Experts: Fiber, DNA Evidence Link Rodriguez and Sjodin, 
BISMARCK TRIB., Aug. 23, 2006, at A1. 
58 See Chuck Haga & Pam Louwagie, A Wrenching Verdict, STAR TRIB. (Minn.-St. Paul, 
MN), Sept. 23, 2006, at A1.  North Dakota law does not allow for the death penalty.  Id. 
59 United States v. Fell, 531 F.3d 197, 205 (2d Cir. 2008). 
60 United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 265-66 (2d Cir. 2009) (Raggi, J., concurring in 
denial of reh’g en banc). 
61 Id. at 206-07. 
62 Strat Douthat & Jenna Russell, Jury Votes Death for Vermont Killer, Sentence Is First 
in 50 Years in Vt., BOST. GLOBE, July 15, 2005, at B1. 
63 Lawrence Buser, One Brother Wants Trial, the Other Wants to Take Guilty Plea, COM. 
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Mar. 11, 2000, at B1. 
64 The Carpenter brothers were also charged with using a firearm during a crime of 
violence and killing a witness to a federal crime.  Michael Erskine, Reno OK’s Seeking Top 
U.S. Penalty in Lee Case, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Dec. 29, 1999, at B1.  The latter 
charge stems from the fact that the victim, Barbara Lee, was rendered unable to testify 
regarding the events (the subject of the former charge) resulting in her death.  See id. 
65 Id.  Between the 1994 passage of the omnibus federal crime bill, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 
108 Stat. 1796 (1994), and the approval of the capital prosecution against the Carpenter 
brothers, the Justice Department approved approximately seventy capital prosecutions out of 
about 240 instances in which the death penalty had been requested.  Id. 
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death penalty.66  The federal death penalty was authorized only after the 
defense motion was filed.67 
In this instance, the federal and state trials proceeded concurrently, 
requiring the Carpenters to defend themselves in two forums 
simultaneously.  The concurrent trials, combined with the federal trial 
court’s desire to keep a “crisp” schedule in order to move the case “at a 
steady pace,”68 created a logistical nightmare for the defense.  On July 23, 
1999, Fayette County Circuit Court Judge Jon Kerry Blackwood ordered 
the Carpenter brothers to undergo psychiatric exams.69  State prosecutors 
requested the exams in order to determine the defendants’ competency to 
stand trial, as well as their mental states at the time of the offense.70  At this 
time, the Carpenters had not yet been appointed counsel in the state 
proceedings,71 but their appointed counsel in the federal proceedings did 
complain, in federal court, about the state-ordered psychiatric evaluations.72  
Without the ability to intervene in the state proceedings, federal defense 
attorneys were left to rely on assurances from state prosecutors, delivered 
via federal prosecutors, that the state evaluation would not take place for a 
month, leaving state defense attorneys (once appointed) enough time to 
contest the order issued by the state judge.73  Ultimately, the Carpenters 
pleaded guilty to lesser charges in federal court.74  In state court, Robert 
Carpenter was declared mentally retarded and thus ineligible for the death 
penalty.75  Antonio Carpenter was found guilty of first-degree murder 
largely on the basis of his federal plea, which was entered as evidence 
 
66 Bartholomew Sullivan, Carpenter’s Lawyers Try to Kill Death-Penalty Plans, COM. 
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Sept. 25, 1999, at B1.  Available records suggested that all 
twenty-three defendants against whom Rice had sought the death penalty in the previous five 
years were African-American.  She had never filed a notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty against a white defendant.  Id. 
67 See id. 
68 Tom Bailey Jr., Lee Murder Case Trial Gets Nov. 15 Start Date, COM. APPEAL 
(Memphis, Tenn.), Sept. 1, 1999, at A7. 
69 See Tom Bailey Jr., State Judge Delays Psychiatric Tests for Carpenters, COM. 
APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), July 29, 1999, at A16. 
70 Tom Bailey Jr., Collierville Carjacking Gets Long-Distance Attention, COM. APPEAL 
(Memphis, Tenn.), July 28, 1999, at B1. 
71 See Bailey, supra note 68.  On July 28, Judge Blackwood appointed Stephen Hale to 
represent Robert Carpenter and Thomas Minor to represent Antonio Carpenter.  Id. 
72 Id.; see also Bailey, supra note 70. 
73 Bailey, supra note 70. 
74 Tom Bailey Jr., Carjack Defense Fails; Carpenter Convicted Again, COM. APPEAL 
(Memphis, Tenn.), July 21, 2000, at B1. 
75 Michael Erskine, Judge Rules Brother Can’t Face Death in Fatal Carjack: He’s 
Retarded, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Apr. 28, 2000, at B1.  Psychologists testified that 
Carpenter’s IQ was in the mid-60s.  Id. 
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against him in state court,76 but the jury rejected the death penalty and 
instead sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole.77 
3.  Federal Prosecutions Following Reversal of State Convictions 
In other instances, federal capital prosecutions have been initiated only 
after state convictions have been reversed in the state appellate process for 
Fourth Amendment violations.  In North Carolina, Richard Jackson was 
convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to death, but the North 
Carolina Supreme Court reversed the conviction on the grounds that 
Jackson’s confession should not have been admitted at his trial because 
local police officers continued to question Jackson after he invoked his right 
to counsel.78  On remand, Jackson entered a plea and avoided a death 
sentence in North Carolina but was subsequently indicted on similar federal 
charges.  Although Jackson objected to the admission in federal district 
court of evidence that had been collected by authorities after his state court 
plea—Jackson argued that federal authorities were moved to prosecute him 
vindictively on the basis of statements and interviews that he had given 
while in jail, apparently unaware of their potential use in a subsequent 
federal prosecution—he did not object to the admission of his confession in 
federal court.79  Thus, the federal court did not need to determine the 
voluntariness of Jackson’s confession, the issue on which the state appellate 
court had found reversible error.  Jackson was convicted and sentenced to 
death by a federal jury in 2001.80 
The issue that was averted in Jackson’s case arose in the federal 
prosecution of Samuel Ealy.  Charged in relation to three murders arising 
out of a criminal ring led by a local mayor in West Virginia, Ealy was 
acquitted of state murder charges in 1991.81  In his subsequent federal trial 
on charges arising out of the same underlying facts, the district court 
rejected the notion that it was bound to follow the West Virginia court’s 
determination that certain evidence had been obtained in violation of Ealy’s 
Fourth Amendment rights.  Collateral estoppel did not apply because the 
federal government was not a party to the state prosecution.82  In 
 
76 Tom Bailey, Jr., Jury Told of Guilty Plea in Carjack, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), 
July 20, 2000, at A13. 
77 Tom Bailey Jr., Carpenter Jury Spares His Life, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), July 
22, 2000, at B1. 
78 State v. Jackson, 497 S.E.2d 409, 412 (N.C. 1998). 
79 United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 281 (4th Cir. 2001) (rejecting, among others, 
claim of vindictive prosecution and affirming conviction). 
80 Id. at 278. 
81 See United States v. Ealy, 363 F.3d 292, 295 (4th Cir. 2004). 
82 United States v. Ealy, 163 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (W.D. Va. 2001). 
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determining the issue de novo, the court acknowledged that the legal 
principles remained the same, but credited testimony from law enforcement 
officers, whereas the state trial court had not.83 
4.  Federal Prosecution Following State Acquittal 
Kenneth Barrett was tried twice in Oklahoma state court on murder 
charges before being tried, convicted, and sentenced to death in relation to 
the same incident by a federal jury.84  Barrett was a suspected 
methamphetamine producer, and state and local authorities joined forces to 
investigate him.  They executed a “no-knock” search warrant at Barrett’s 
property after midnight.  During the execution of the warrant, Barrett fatally 
shot an Oklahoma Highway Patrol officer in an unmarked vehicle from 
inside his house.85  A jury was unable to reach a verdict in his first state 
trial, and another jury acquitted him of intentional murder at his second 
trial, convicting him instead of a lesser-included offense and sentencing him 
to thirty years in state prison.86  A central issue in those trials and in the 
subsequent federal trial was whether Barrett was aware that the late night 
visitors to his property were in fact police officers and not just run-of-the-
mill trespassers.87  The federal court also had to resolve whether the warrant 
violated Oklahoma state law, which required warrants to be executed 
between the hours of 6 a.m. and 10 p.m. absent certain exceptional 
circumstances.88 
Similarly, Claude Dennis was tried capitally in federal court in relation 
to a murder for which he was acquitted in Virginia state court.89  Dennis 
was charged with that murder, among others, after a joint federal-state task 
force reinvestigated the case.90  Dennis originally faced charges in the 15th 
Judicial Circuit of Virginia, which is comprised of the city of Richmond.  
 
83 Id. (“In essence, the state trial judge disbelieved the law enforcement officers as to 
their version of the search of the garage.  I have heard the evidence, and I find that the 
officers are telling the truth about the search.  The legal principles remain the same, but my 
different view of the evidence causes me to reach an opposite conclusion from the state 
judge.”). 
84 United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1085 (10th Cir. 2007). 
85 Id. at 1084-86. 
86 Id. at 1085. 
87 Id. at 1083. 
88 Id. at 1090-93. 
89 United States v. Beckford, 211 F.3d 1266 (4th Cir. 2000). 
90 United States v. Beckford, 964 F. Supp. 1010, 1013 (E.D. Va. 1997).  Dennis was part 
of the “Poison Clan,” a Richmond, Virginia gang involved in narcotics distribution.  The 
Richmond Cold Homicide Task Force was comprised of members of the Richmond Police 
Department, the Virginia State Police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and involved 
the Commonwealth’s Attorney for the City of Richmond.  Id. 
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However, the federal jury was drawn from the Eastern District of Virginia, 
a much broader area that includes the suburbs of Richmond.  As a federal 
court noted in a related case, “By bringing the case in federal court, the 
United States will likely obtain a jury composition that could not exist in 
the Circuit Court for the City of Richmond absent a Batson violation.”91 
5.  Federal Prosecution When New Evidence Emerges 
After State Conviction 
Federal authorities again took a second bite at a death sentence in the 
case of Brent Simmons, who was convicted for the murder of his ex-
girlfriend and her boyfriend, both students at James Madison University.  
Simmons was charged in a local court in Virginia, but the jury deadlocked 
on the issue of guilt.  Simmons accepted a plea to second-degree murder 
and was sentenced to twenty years in jail.92  Years later, new evidence 
emerged that made the case against Simmons stronger.93  State prosecutors 
were prevented by the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment (as 
incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment) from reopening the case.  
However, federal authorities were able to bring capital charges against 
Simmons for the same acts based on anti-stalking provisions of the 
Violence Against Women Act.94 
*  *  * 
In sum, the above cases indicate that federal prosecutions are not 
limited to instances in which the states are unwilling or unable to 
 
91 United States v. Claiborne, 92 F. Supp. 2d 503, 510-12 (E.D. Va. 2000) (citing Batson 
v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986)).  Beverly Claiborne’s case, like Claude Dennis’s, was 
heard in the Richmond court by a jury that was 75% African-American.  The typical jury 
pool for the Richmond Division of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Virginia is approximately 10% African-American.  Id. (citing United States v. Jones, 36 F. 
Supp. 2d 304, 307-08 (E.D. Va. 1999)). 
92 Man Agrees to Plea in Two Slayings, WASH. TIMES, May 1, 1998, at C8. 
93 Calvin R. Trice, Killer Could Face New Charges, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Nov. 
15, 2002, at B2, available at 2002 WLNR 1467740. 
94 Death Sought for Students’ Killer, DAILY PRESS (Newport News, VA), July 30, 2004, 
at C5.  The Supreme Court ruled that Congress lacked the power under the Commerce 
Clause to provide for civil remedies for gender-based violence as it had done in the Violence 
Against Women Act (VAWA).  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  But the 
criminal anti-stalking provisions of VAWA have sustained similar challenges.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Lankford, 196 F.3d 563 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied 529 U.S. 1119; United 
States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 2261 against 
Commerce Clause challenge because “Congress may rationally have decided that domestic 
violence is a problem of national importance, with a significant effect on interstate 
commerce”). 
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criminalize and prosecute the underlying conduct.95  Instead, by terms of the 
Petite Policy, the state sentences in each of these cases were “insufficient.”  
A fair inference is that the federal interest is deemed more substantial than 
the state interest when a federal prosecution is more likely to produce a 
death sentence. 
Congruently, in some instances the federal interest is seemingly 
vindicated only by a certain sentencing outcome, regardless of whether a 
state prosecution has resulted in a conviction and lengthy sentence.  As one 
federal judge, critical of the Petite Policy, has written, “I refuse to accept 
the notion that the federal interest is to demand convictions rather than 
prosecutions.  I see nothing in the Constitution or any statute that so defines 
our federal interest.”96 
III.  IN SEARCH OF A LIMITING CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
The above examples illustrate that the federal death penalty in practice 
does not operate in isolation from state criminal justice systems, nor is it 
limited in application to defendants and crimes that raise a peculiarly 
federal interest.  In some instances, the impact on individuals is manifestly 
unfair and intuitively out of step with familiar constitutional norms such as 
equal protection and double jeopardy.  However, an examination of these 
and other constitutional doctrines reveals that none is sufficient to deal with 
the contemporary realities of federal and state law enforcement. 
A.  THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 
The necessary predicate condition for the present relationship between 
federal and state criminal jurisdiction is an interpretation of the Commerce 
Clause that deems constitutional all of the criminal legislation passed by 
Congress.  A federal criminal law that proscribes even purely intrastate, 
noneconomic behavior is facially valid so long as Congress, at the time of 
enactment, had a rational basis for concluding that such behavior, taken in 
the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.97  For example, 
although the Supreme Court articulated a limit on the ability of Congress to 
proscribe the possession of a gun within a school zone,98 that limitation 
does not prevent Congress from criminalizing the possession of a firearm 
 
95 Accord ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 31 (“In most such [federal 
prosecutions], state interest in pursuing the offending conduct is not lacking.”). 
96 United States v. Wilson, 413 F.3d 382, 393 (3d Cir. 2005). 
97 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that private use of personally 
cultivated marijuana for medical purposes is part of economic class of activities that have a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce and thus subject to total congressional ban). 
98 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
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by a convicted felon or illegal alien, so long as the legislation contains an 
express jurisdictional requirement that the gun or ammunition have passed 
in interstate commerce.99  Likewise, Congress may proscribe virtually any 
conduct that relates to drug trafficking.100  Similarly, the Commerce Clause 
does not erect a barrier to the criminalization of simple arson, provided that 
the building is not an owner-occupied residence.101  Certainly, some 
policing is done at the margins by as-applied inquiries as to whether the 
jurisdictional requirements are satisfied in the facts of a particular case.  In 
relation to some criminal statutes, courts have required satisfaction of a 
jurisdictional element contained in the statute’s text,102 or have required a 
factual showing of a nexus between the alleged violent crime and otherwise 
proscribed behavior.103  Although a comprehensive analysis of the outer 
 
99 See, e.g., United States v. Latu, 479 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir. 2007) (declining to extend 
Lopez to prohibition on illegal alien possessing firearm); United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 
(4th Cir. 1996) (declining to extend holding of Lopez to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)); United States 
v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387 (11th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Lee, 72 F.3d 55 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (same). 
100 See, e.g., Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 17-22; United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 110-11 
(2d Cir. 1998) (rejecting Commerce Clause challenges to various criminal provisions of 
Controlled Substances Act because the Act “provide[s] a specific, reasonable finding by 
Congress that local narcotics activity substantially affects interstate commerce,” and drug 
trafficking is an inherently economic activity). 
101 See Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).  Jones interpreted 18 U.S.C. 
§ 844(i), which addresses the destruction by means of fire or explosive of any property used 
in interstate commerce or in any activity affecting interstate commerce, narrowly so as not to 
reach the behavior of Dewey Jones, who threw a Molotov cocktail into the home of his 
cousin.  Id. at 851.  The government argued that the home was “used” in interstate commerce 
in the respect that it secured a loan from an out-of-state lender, was the subject of an 
insurance policy from an out-of-state insurer, and received natural gas from a source out of 
state.  Id. at 854-55.  Justice Ginsburg observed that under the government’s reading, “hardly 
a building in the land would fall outside the federal statute’s domain.”  Id. at 857.  Other 
courts have not hesitated to apply 18. U.S.C. § 844(i) to instances in which the house was a 
rental property.  See, e.g., United States v. Logan, 419 F.3d 172, 181 (2d Cir. 2005); United 
States v. Soy, 413 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2005). 
102 See, e.g., United States v. Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 632 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that 
jurisdictional hook is not “a talisman that wards off constitutional challenges” but rather 
tends to “make a facial constitutional challenge unlikely or impossible, and to direct 
litigation toward the statutory question of whether, in the particular case, the regulated 
conduct possesses the requisite connection to interstate commerce”); United States v. 
Holston, 343 F.3d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 2003) (conducting Commerce Clause inquiry that goes 
beyond whether jurisdictional requirement of statute superficially met); United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 612 (2000) (explaining that the presence of a “jurisdictional hook” 
in a statute’s text that limits reach of statute to activities having an explicit connection with 
or effect on interstate commerce helps establish the statute’s legitimacy under the Commerce 
Clause). 
103 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 68 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D. Mich. 1999).  In Garcia, 
the court considered a defendant’s indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 1959, which prohibits 
violent crimes in aid of racketeering (VCAR).  In contrast to the Racketeer Influenced and 
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limits of the Commerce Clause and the basis of authority for the federal 
government to enact criminal laws is beyond the scope of this Article, the 
vast majority of such legislation has been and will continue to be facially 
valid under the Commerce Clause, barring a drastic change of interpretation 
by the Supreme Court.104 
B.  DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THE DOCTRINE OF DUAL SOVEREIGNTY 
A defendant searching for refuge from a federal capital prosecution 
successive to state charges, such as Kenneth Barrett or Claude Dennis, 
might look next to the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause.  The 
clause enshrines a “fundamental idea in our constitutional heritage,”105 
borne out of a persistent “fear and abhorrence of governmental power to try 
people twice for the same conduct.”106  The underlying justification for the 
prohibition on double jeopardy is that: 
the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated 
attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to 
embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of 
 
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006), which incorporates a 
jurisdictional element by defining “enterprise” as one that is engaged in interstate commerce, 
the VCAR contains no such requirement tying the violent act to interstate commerce.  The 
court in Garcia found that the de minimis impact on interstate commerce of the defendant’s 
alleged activities—which were purely intrastate but did involve the use of federal interstate 
highways—was sufficient to sustain a RICO indictment but not a charge under VCAR.  Id. 
104 Accord Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 12 (recognizing Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as “a 
comprehensive regime to combat the international and interstate traffic in illicit drugs”).  
Compare Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 70 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the justification of 
legislation under the Necessary and Proper Clause converts the clause into a pretext for 
accomplishment of objects not entrusted to government, thereby stripping states of ability to 
regulate local activities), with id. at 38-39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (denying that broad reading 
of Necessary and Proper Clause will obliterate distinction between local and national spheres 
because power can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation of an 
interstate market).  Federal crimes that touch upon narcotics trade in some manner, such as 
21 U.S.C. § 848 (continuing criminal enterprise), are presumptively valid because in 
enacting the CSA, “Congress made specific findings . . . that local narcotics activity 
substantially affects interstate commerce.”  United States v. Walker, 142 F.3d 103, 111 (2d 
Cir. 1998).  Similarly, criminal activity that involves the use of a firearm may be proscribed 
by the federal government under the Commerce Clause.  See, e.g., United States v. Weems, 
322 F.3d 18, 26 (1st Cir. 2003) (upholding 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)).  But see United States v. 
Patton, 451 F.3d 615, 634-36 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting inconsistency between firearms cases 
and recent Supreme Court Commerce Clause jurisprudence).  
105 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); see also Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S 
121, 151-53 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (characterizing the prohibition on double jeopardy 
as a “universal maxim of the common law”). 
106 Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 151-53 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even though innocent 
he may be found guilty.107 
However, the interpretation of this common law tenet is limited in its ability 
to address concerns of defendants subject to successive state and federal 
prosecutions for the same act.  In the middle of the last century, the 
Supreme Court articulated what is known as the “dual sovereignty doctrine” 
when it ruled that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a state from 
prosecuting and convicting a defendant who previously had been tried in 
federal court.108  Conversely, no bar exists to a federal prosecution 
following a state prosecution for the same conduct.109  These decisions 
reiterated a formalistic application of double jeopardy and dual sovereignty: 
the sovereignty of the states and the federal government derive from 
different sources; a single act that violates the laws of each is actually two 
crimes against two separate sovereigns; the Double Jeopardy Clause 
prevents only multiple prosecutions by the same sovereign.110 
The dual sovereignty doctrine conceives of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause as a mechanism for policing within the bounds of federal and state 
sovereignty, and ignores the interaction between the two.  As a result, the 
clause’s role in protecting the individual against oppressive governmental 
power is lost when the federal and state governments act in concert.  The 
dissent in Bartkus observed that, when “looked at from the standpoint of the 
individual,” the doctrine’s position “that a second trial for the same act is 
somehow less offensive if one of the trials is conducted by the Federal 
Government and the other by a State” is “too subtle . . . to grasp.”111 
 
107 Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1959). 
108 Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 121 (allowing state prosecution where defendant had been 
acquitted in federal court). 
109 Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (allowing federal prosecution where 
defendants pleaded guilty in state court). 
110 See id. at 193 (quoting United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922)).  In Moore 
v. Illinois, the Court explained, 
Every citizen of the United States is also a citizen of a State or territory.  He may be said to owe 
allegiance to two sovereigns, and may be liable to punishment for an infraction of the laws of 
either.  The same act may be an offence or transgression of the laws of both.  . . .  That either or 
both may (if they see fit) punish such an offender, cannot be doubted.  Yet it cannot be truly 
averred that the offender has been twice punished for the same offence; but only that by one act 
he has committed two offences, for each of which he is justly punishable.  He could not plead the 
punishment by one in bar to a conviction in the other . . . . 
55 U.S. 13, 20 (1852). 
111 Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Black feared that “[t]he 
power to try a second time will be used, as have all similar procedures, to make scapegoats 
of helpless, political, religious, or racial minorities and those who differ, who do not conform 
and who resist tyranny.”  Id. at 163.  His dissent echoes that of Justice McLean, who earlier 
argued that although the prohibition on multiple prosecutions applies to respective 
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The continued viability of the dual sovereignty doctrine as articulated 
in Bartkus and Abbate is open to question on multiple grounds.112  Bartkus 
and Abbate were decided before incorporation of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause through the Fourteenth Amendment.113  Thus, those decisions were 
fundamentally concerned with avoiding any potential mischief that 
asymmetrical application of the Double Jeopardy Clause could work in the 
balance of power between the federal government and the states.  Of 
particular concern was the potential obstruction of federal law enforcement 
priorities by lenient state prosecutions.  As noted, “[I]f the States are free to 
prosecute criminal acts violating their laws, and the resultant state 
prosecutions bar federal prosecutions based on the same acts, federal law 
must necessarily be hindered.”114  The concern with federal-state tension is 
also reflected in the precedent marshaled in support of the dual sovereignty 
doctrine.  Justice Frankfurter’s majority opinion in Bartkus cited a line of 
cases culminating with Moore v. Illinois in which the Court held that states 
could permissibly enforce statutes that were identical to the Fugitive Slave 
Act, so long as the rule of Prigg v. Pennsylvania, protecting the rights of 
slaveholders, was observed.115  The second major precedent cited by 
 
governments, “its spirit applies with equal force against a double punishment, for the same 
act, by a State and the federal government . . . .  Nothing can be more repugnant or 
contradictory than two punishments for the same act.  It would be a mockery of justice and a 
reproach to civilization.”  In Justice McLean’s view, such a situation “would violate, not 
only the common principles of humanity, but would be repugnant to the nature of both 
governments.”  Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 439-40 (1847) (McLean, J., dissenting).  In a later 
case employing the same view of dual sovereignty that would allow for multiple 
prosecutions for the same offense by federal and state governments, Justice McLean noted 
that the state and federal governments “operate on the same people,” and those people 
“would not be satisfied with the logic or justice of the argument.”  Moore, 55 U.S. at 22. 
112 See, e.g., United States v. Grimes, 641 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1981) (questioning doctrinal 
underpinnings of decisions and their continued relevance in light of changed circumstances). 
113 Justice Frankfurter noted in Bartkus that “we have held from the beginning and 
uniformly that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not apply to the 
States any of the provisions of the first eight amendments as such.”  359 U.S. at 124.  In 
Palko v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court declined to extend the Double Jeopardy Clause to 
the states, and therefore confirmed that states were not prohibited from appealing a criminal 
conviction.  302 U.S. 319 (1937).  More than two decades later, the Court held that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does apply to the states.  See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 
794-96 (1969). 
114 Abbate, 359 U.S. at 195; see also Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 156 (Black, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing majority opinion for “rel[ying] on the unwarranted assumption that State and 
Nation will seek to subvert each other’s laws”); United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 383 
(1922) (“If a state were to punish the manufacture, transportation and sale of intoxicating 
liquor by small or nominal fines, the race of offenders to the courts of that state to plead 
guilty and secure immunity from federal prosecution for such acts would not make respect 
for the federal statute or for its deterrent effect.”). 
115 359 U.S. at 131-33. 
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Frankfurter was United States v. Lanza, which involved enforcement of the 
Eighteenth Amendment, the text of which explicitly committed its 
enforcement to both the state and federal governments.116  Although the 
potential for state obstruction of the enforcement of Prohibition was not as 
high as with fugitive slave laws, it was still far from negligible, given the 
express rejection of the Eighteenth Amendment in states like Rhode Island 
and Connecticut.  In this context, the prioritization of federal power over 
potential individual rights issues is perhaps inevitable, but for precisely 
these reasons, the decisions may not articulate the most balanced rule of 
decision for resolution of contemporary cases.117 
In addition to concerns about the use of precedent inscribed in a 
particular historical moment, a significant change in circumstances calls 
into question the current usefulness of the dual sovereignty doctrine.  
Incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause against the states has obviated 
the need for a doctrine that protects against unilateral state obstructionism, 
and expanded federal criminal jurisdiction has challenged a core 
presumption of the doctrine that “the benignant spirit in which the 
institutions both of the state and federal systems are administered” is 
“almost certain” to prevent double punishment for “essentially the same” 
acts, except “in instances of peculiar enormity, or where the public safety 
demanded extraordinary rigor.”118  In fact, a “central feature” of current 
federal law enforcement policy is cooperation with state and local 
entities.119 
When courts do recognize the threat posed to individual liberty by 
concurrent state and federal criminal jurisdiction, the posited solution has 
been that Congress could elect under the Supremacy Clause to make federal 
criminal jurisdiction exclusive, or else could pass a law restricting federal 
courts from entertaining successive state-federal prosecutions.120  Clearly, 
 
116 U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, § 2 (“The Congress and the several States shall have 
concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.”), repealed by U.S. 
CONST. amend. XXI. 
117 Accord Grimes, 641 F.2d at 103 (advising that “given such a politically freighted 
issue,” the holding of those cases “should be read with considerable caution”). 
118 Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. 410, 435 (1847). 
119 See DOJ STATISTICAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 4 (“[S]tate and federal law 
enforcement officials often work cooperatively to maximize their overall ability to prevent 
and prosecute violent criminal activity in their respective communities.”). 
120 United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 383 (1922) (“If Congress sees fit to bar 
prosecution by the federal courts for any act when punishment for violation of state 
prohibition has been imposed, it can, of course, do so by proper legislative provision, but it 
has not done so.”).  In limited instances, Congress has provided that a judgment of 
conviction or acquittal on the merits in state court will bar federal prosecution of the same 
conduct.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 659, 660, 1991, 2101, 2117 (2006); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-
36, 1282 (2006). 
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Congress has not adopted this approach, and the dual sovereignty doctrine 
now allows states and the federal government to act in conjunction (whether 
willfully or not) to accomplish what neither could under the Constitution if 
acting alone.121 
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has not undertaken a reexamination of 
the doctrine, and today courts routinely dismiss the arguments of individual 
defendants subject to multiple prosecutions with little more than a cursory 
analysis and recitation of the doctrine that one act can be a crime against 
two sovereigns, neither bound by the actions of the other.122  As discussed, 
the dual sovereignty doctrine developed in part out of a concern with the 
ability of states to undermine and obstruct federal law enforcement.  Thus, 
in the first instance, the doctrine requires a subordination of judicial concern 
for the rights of individuals to the rights of competing political units within 
our federal system.  The inability of the dual sovereignty doctrine to address 
the concerns of individuals has grown as the doctrine remains unyielding in 
the face of mounting and routine federal-state cooperation in criminal 
justice matters. 
Federal-state cooperation has been particularly prolific in the area of 
drug law enforcement.123  Even when federal and state authorities act 
through one single task force to investigate criminal activity, courts do not 
treat them as one prosecuting authority.  Thus, defendants cannot invoke the 
doctrine of collateral estoppel to carry over favorable rulings from a prior 
prosecution into a second trial by a separate sovereign, even when both 
sovereigns participated in the investigation of the case.124  A narrow 
 
121 Accord Grimes, 641 F.2d at 101 (“Whenever a constitutional provision is equally 
enforceable against the state and federal governments, it would appear inconsistent to allow 
the parallel actions of state and federal officials to produce results which would be 
constitutionally impermissible if accomplished by either jurisdiction alone.”). 
122 See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990) (asserting that 
“successive prosecutions for the same conduct remain rarities” and declining to apply state 
court suppression ruling in federal court because federal government “cannot be fairly 
considered to have had its day in court”); United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 
909 (2d Cir. 1984) (“The Supreme Court has long held that an acceptable cost of federalism, 
tolerable under principles of both double jeopardy and due process, is the risk of successive 
prosecutions by state and federal authorities for identical conduct.”). 
123 See Davis, 906 F.2d at 831 (“As the challenge facing the nation’s law enforcement 
authorities has grown in sophistication and complexity, cooperation between federal and 
local agencies has become increasingly important and increasingly commonplace.  In 
particular, joint federal-state operations have proved a crucial weapon in the long struggle 
against those who deal in illegal drugs.”). 
124 See id. at 829.  In Davis, the defendant was investigated by the “Capital District Drug 
Enforcement Task Force” in Albany, New York.  The task force was comprised of state and 
local officers who were “deputized as Special Deputy United States Marshals and operated 
under the direct control and supervision of the United States Drug Enforcement Agency.”  
Id. at 831.  The policy of the task force was to elect prosecution in “either state or federal 
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exception exists where a second trial is so thoroughly controlled by the 
sovereign who directed the first trial that it can be said to be a “sham and 
cover” for a second prosecution by that sovereign,125 but the conditions for 
applying this exception are rarely, if ever, found by a court.126 
C.  EQUAL PROTECTION 
A defendant, such as Ronell Wilson or Donald Fell, selected for capital 
prosecution federally where concurrent jurisdiction exists with a state that 
does not have the death penalty might also hope to find some shelter in the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (rendered applicable 
to the federal government through the Fifth Amendment).127  However, 
courts have heard and rejected similar claims from defendants facing 
dramatically higher sentences on narcotics charges as a result of federal, 
 
court, whichever is most appropriate.”  Id.  Apparently the prosecution was “most 
appropriate” initially in the court of Greene County, until that court suppressed key 
evidence.  Two weeks later, a federal indictment was returned in the Northern District of 
New York.  Id.  The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling that the prosecution 
should be bound by the Green County suppression ruling, finding that the federal 
government “cannot be fairly considered to have had its day in court” because it was not a 
party to the state case—no federal prosecutors were present during the suppression hearing, 
and “[n]othing indicates that they provided assistance or advice to the local authorities at any 
time, or were involved in any way with the local prosecution or the decision not to appeal the 
suppression order.”  Id. at 835.  Other courts invoke a “laboring oar” theory and allow 
nonmutual collateral estoppel when there was substantial and active participation by the 
federal government in a prior state trial.  See United States v. Parcel of Land at 5 Bell Rock 
Road, 896 F.2d 605, 610 (1st Cir. 1990); United States v. Nasworthy, 710 F. Supp. 1353, 
1355 (S.D. Fla. 1989). 
125 Justice Brennan articulated this exception in his Bartkus dissent.  He wrote that “the 
record before us shows that the extent of participation of the federal authorities here 
constituted this state prosecution actually a second federal prosecution.”  Bartkus v. Illinois, 
359 U.S. 121, 165-66 (1959) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Liddy, 542 
F.2d 76 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (recognizing exception to the Bartkus rule to prevent federal 
authorities from manipulating state processes to accomplish that which they cannot 
constitutionally do themselves). 
126 See, e.g., Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d at 901 (declining to “refine the somewhat 
ambiguous contours” of the “sham and cover” exception but finding it inapplicable in the 
context of joint investigation of criminal activity by state and federal authorities). 
127 The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that “[n]o State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.  Although by its terms the Amendment applies to the states, the 
Supreme Court has read a concomitant restriction against the federal government into the 
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[A]ll racial classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or 
local governmental actor, must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.”); 
Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
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rather than state, prosecutions.128  And although it seems inherently unfair 
to select certain offenders for federal capital prosecution out of the vast 
numbers of those eligible for such treatment, unfairness alone does not give 
rise to an equal protection claim.129  It is not clear whether or how equal 
protection’s demand that federal and state governments have, at a 
minimum, a rational basis for treating similarly situated individuals 
differently extends to the charging decisions of prosecutors.130  If a statute is 
of general application and clearly satisfies the rational basis standard, 
claims that a prosecutorial action violates equal protection are treated as 
tantamount to claims of selective prosecution.131  Such claims place the 
burden not on the government to explain its treatment of the defendant in 
relation to others similarly situated, but on the defendant, who must 
ultimately establish that the prosecutorial decision was motivated by 
impermissible factors.132  The desire to attain harsher penalties is not an 
impermissible factor,133 nor is the desire to circumvent state constitutional 
 
128 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 4 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 1993) (rejecting equal 
protection and due process claims from defendant who urged that sole purpose of charging 
case federally was to attain higher penalties); United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897, 898-99 
(9th Cir. 1993); see also Beale, supra note 15, at 997-99 (discussing disparities between 
federal and state sentences). 
129 But see Beale, supra note 15, at 996-1001; Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The 
Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643, 668-73 (1997) (arguing that 
disparate treatment violates equal protection in absence of rational basis for distinguishing 
defendants tried in federal court versus state court). 
130 See Clymer, supra note 129, at 684-86 (listing federal court decisions denying 
implicitly and explicitly existence of rational basis requirement for prosecutorial decisions); 
see also Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992) (ruling that federal 
prosecutor’s decision not to file recommendation for downward departure in sentencing must 
be rationally related to a legitimate government end). 
131 See Clymer, supra note 129, at 684-86. 
132 See, e.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 
434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); see also United States v. Oakes, 11 F.3d 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(“[W]e have no jurisdiction to review prosecutors’ charging decisions, absent proof of 
discrimination based on suspect characteristics such as race, religion, gender or personal 
beliefs.”); United States v. Mills, 964 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. 
Carter, 953 F.2d 1449, 1461-62 (5th Cir. 1992) (rejecting equal protection claim based on 
federal/state sentencing disparity); United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992); 
United States v. Allen, 954 F.2d 1160 (6th Cir. 1992).  To establish a selective prosecution 
claim, defendants must demonstrate that they have been singled out for prosecution based 
upon an “unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.”  
United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464-65 (1996) (quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 
448, 456 (1962)); United States v. Diggs, 613 F.2d 988, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
133 See, e.g., Oakes, 11 F.3d 897.  In Oakes, the defendant’s federal prosecution resulted 
in his imprisonment and forfeiture of his family home to the government.  Id. at 898.  As a 
first-time offender, had he been prosecuted for the possession of one hundred marijuana 
plants in state court, his sentence would have been between zero and ninety days.  Id.  “The 
government admit[ted] that Oakes was prosecuted in federal court primarily because federal 
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protections.134  Although a racial disparity has been demonstrated in the 
application of the federal death penalty,135 this fact alone does not give rise 
to an equal protection claim, absent a showing of intentional 
discrimination.136 
Intentional discrimination in a criminal justice litigation context is 
notoriously difficult to prove.137  In order to gain discovery rights on a 
selective prosecution claim, the defense must establish a “colorable basis” 
for the conclusion that impermissible factors were in operation in the 
decision to seek federal charges.138  Discovery, if attained, may not be 
 
law provides for stiffer penalties and more rigorous forfeiture of the defendants’ property.”  
Id.  The court, although troubled by this disparity, found that “[u]nfortunately, the law gives 
us no choice but to affirm.”  Id.; see also United States v. Nance, 962 F.2d 860, 865 (9th Cir. 
1992) (“[T]here are no grounds for finding a due process violation, even when the motive for 
federal prosecution is that harsher sentences are possible.”). 
134 See, e.g., United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1992).  The question 
facing the court in Ucciferri was whether the district court properly dismissed a federal 
indictment upon finding that the case had been investigated primarily by state authorities, 
had no federal ties, and had been referred for federal prosecution solely for purposes of 
taking advantage of less stringent federal standards concerning search warrants, wire 
surveillance, and informants.  Id. at 953.  The district court found that the federal indictment 
was “making a mockery of state constitutional protections.”  Id.  The Court of Appeals 
reinstated the indictment, acknowledging that although “systematic transfer of what may 
properly be called ‘state’ cases to federal court is a legitimate source of concern to federal 
courts, precedent in this circuit suggests that an indictment may not be dismissed based upon 
concerns of this kind.”  Id. at 954. 
135 Between 1995 and 2000, United States Attorneys recommended the death penalty 
with respect to 494 defendants, 85 of whom were white and 242 of whom were black.  See 
DOJ STATISTICAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 12.  The Department of Justice disputes that a 
racial disparity exists in the operation of the federal death penalty.  See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY SYSTEM: SUPPLEMENTARY DATA, ANALYSIS AND 
REVISED PROTOCOLS FOR CAPITAL CASE REVIEW (2001), http://www.usdoj.gov/ 
dag/pubdoc/deathpenaltystudy.htm (acknowledging that “[t]he proportion of minority 
defendants in federal capital cases exceeds the proportion of minority individuals in the 
general population,” but asserting that “[t]his is not the result of any form of bias,” but rather 
a product of the fact that “organized drug trafficking is largely carried out by gangs whose 
membership is drawn from minority groups”). 
136 See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 295 n.15 (1987) (finding a statistical 
demonstration that African-American perpetrators of murder against white victims were 
significantly more likely to be charged with a capital offense than other groups is not 
sufficient to establish an equal protection violation because “decisions whether to prosecute 
and what to charge necessarily are individualized and involve infinite factual variations”); 
see also United States v. Bass, 536 U.S. 862 (2002) (per curiam) (rejecting claim that 
statistics from Department of Justice reports supported claim of selective prosecution under 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 456). 
137 See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 297 (requiring “exceptionally clear proof before . . . 
infer[ring] that the discretion has been abused”). 
138 See, e.g., Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 (ruling that defendant who seeks discovery on a 
claim of selective prosecution must show some evidence both of discriminatory effect and 
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particularly helpful, given that prosecutorial authorities, federal or state, are 
not required to make the charging decision pursuant to any written 
policy.139  Information relating to specific capital charging decisions of the 
United States Attorney may not be disclosed outside of the Department of 
Justice without prior approval of the Attorney General,140 and the 
Department takes the position that “[t]he prosecution memoranda, death 
penalty evaluation forms, non-decisional information forms and any other 
internal memoranda informing the review process and the Attorney 
General’s decision are not subject to discovery by the defendant or the 
defendant’s attorney.”141  Courts have consistently held that the internal 
policy of the Justice Department creates no substantive rights for those 
prosecuted under circumstances within the purview of the Petite Policy.142  
 
discriminatory intent).  In Armstrong, the decision to charge defendants with federal rather 
than California offenses meant that they faced a sentence of at least ten years and up to life 
in prison.  Under California law, the minimum sentence for that offense was three years, and 
the maximum was five.  See also United States v. Davis, 904 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. La. 1995) 
(rejecting selective prosecution claim that sought to shift burden to state to prove that death 
penalty was not being used in a racially biased manner). 
139 See, e.g., United States v. Jacobs, 4 F.3d 603 (8th Cir. 1993).  Jacobs argued that the 
Fifth Amendment requires federal and state authorities to develop a formal procedure to be 
used to determine which sovereign will charge a particular defendant.  Id. at 604.  The court 
felt that “Jacobs’s arguments border[ed] on the frivolous.”  Id.  Because Jacobs did not 
establish that the decision to prosecute him in federal court was based on impermissible 
factors such as race, religion, or other arbitrary and unjustifiable classifications, his claim 
failed.  Id. (citing Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978)).  One federal court found 
that due process required the existence of a neutral policy by which a joint federal-state task 
force would determine which cases to refer for federal prosecution, United States v. 
Williams, 746 F. Supp. 1076 (D. Utah 1990), but this case was reversed on appeal, 963 F.2d 
1337 (10th Cir. 1992), and its reasoning was thoroughly rejected in United States v. 
Andersen, 940 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1991), where the court wrote: “[a]lthough a prosecutor 
obviously cannot base charging decisions on a defendant’s race, sex, religion, or exercise of 
a statutory or constitutional right, ‘so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe 
that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to 
prosecute, and what charge to file . . . generally rests entirely in his discretion.’”  Id. at 596 
(quoting Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 364). 
140 See USAM, supra note 29, § 9-10.040. 
141 See id. § 9-10.080.  The Department of Justice successfully shields these materials 
from discovery under the deliberative process privilege.  See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 8 
F. Supp. 2d 253, 283-84 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying discovery request and upholding 
deliberative process privilege where “[d]iscovery of the deliberative materials would have a 
chilling effect on the thorough evaluation of these issues and hinder the just, frank, and fair 
review of the decision for every individual defendant who faces the prospect of receiving a 
Notice of Intent to Seek the Death Penalty”). 
142 See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 231 F.3d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[I]t is 
clear that the USAM [United States Attorney Manual] . . . ‘is not intended to, does not, and 
may not be relied upon to create any rights, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by 
any party in any manner civil or criminal.’” (quoting USAM, supra note 29, § 1.1-000)); see 
also United States v. Davis, 906 F.2d 829, 832 (2d Cir. 1990) (clarifying that Petite Policy 
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Finally, the Attorney General’s decision to authorize a death penalty 
prosecution is not reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act.143 
Additionally, the formalistic rigidity of the dual sovereignty doctrine 
limits the ability of defendants to get at the charging practices of both 
relevant prosecuting authorities in instances of joint federal-state 
cooperation.  As noted above, the doctrine is oriented toward state-federal 
obstruction.  The formalism of first separating the actions of one sovereign 
from another, and then persisting in strictly cabining them off as though 
they have no bearing on one another, has the potential to obfuscate what 
could otherwise be deemed discriminatory charging practices.  When the 
state and federal governments collude, an equal protection or due process 
violation may have occurred in a jurisdiction other than the one in which 
the prosecution takes place.  Just as the courts have been loath to find that 
the state and federal government ought to be bound by the other’s actions 
for purposes of double jeopardy or collateral estoppel, courts may not hold 
one sovereign accountable for discriminatory charging practices of another 
jurisdiction—including the practice of referring certain defendants for 
federal prosecution—even though the presence of the second prosecution 
may very well be the product of that discrimination or arbitrariness. 
D.  THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 
As learned by Claude Dennis, the decision to charge a federal crime 
can result in the summoning of a dramatically different jury pool than had 
the crime been charged in a state court.  For example, a defendant charged 
for a crime in Suffolk County, the jurisdiction of which encompasses 
Boston, Massachusetts, would draw a jury from a voting-age population 
that is 20% African-American.144  However, if charged by the United States 
Attorney in the Eastern Division of the District of Massachusetts, the jury 
would be drawn from a voting-age population that is 7% African-
 
“is not a limitation on the government’s sovereign right to vindicate its interests and 
values”); United States v. Booth, 673 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1982) (“The [Petite Policy] does 
not create a corresponding right in the accused.”); United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 
536-37 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“The Petite policy is not law, but rather an executive policy that 
permits exceptions in the Attorney General’s discretion.”); United States v. Snell, 592 F.2d 
1083, 1087 (9th Cir. 1979) (rejecting the claim that the “internal housekeeping rule” of the 
Department of Justice entitled criminal defendant to judicial relief). 
143 See Walker v. Reno, 925 F. Supp. 124 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (ruling that actions 
undertaken by the Attorney General within the exercise of his or her prosecutorial discretion 
are committed to agency discretion and should be presumed immune from judicial review 
under 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2)).  The Walker court rejected the argument that the protocols set 
forth in USAM § 9-10.000 provided standards by which courts might review individual 
charging decisions.  Id. at 128-29. 
144 See United States v. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d 29, 37 (D. Mass. 2005). 
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American.145  In practice, moreover, after accounting for the rate of return 
on jury summonses in the Eastern Division, the percentage of the pool that 
is African-American drops to 3%.146  The vast majority of juries drawn in 
the Eastern Division, in fact, do not have a single African-American 
member.147  Similar disparities exist in many other areas, where the jury 
pool in federal court will have a dramatically lower incidence of minority 
representation and participation.148 
As dramatic as these numbers may be, they do not necessarily amount 
to a violation of the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee to criminal defendants of 
a jury that represents a fair cross-section of the community.149  In order to 
prove a Sixth Amendment fair cross-section claim,  
a defendant must show (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive” 
group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from 
which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such 
persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic 
exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.150 
Although this analysis, like the double jeopardy rubric, has been criticized 
as being overly formalistic in general,151 it is particularly problematic in 
relation to the differences in composition between juries in the federal and 
state systems.  A change in forum brings a change in “community,” and the 
second prong of the Sixth Amendment inquiry does not interrogate the 
choice of forum or the boundaries of “community” as drawn by the forum.  
Although the third prong calls for a showing that the system itself is 
responsible for producing the disparity (rather than failure on the part of the 
 
145 Id. 
146 See id. at 47-49. 
147 Id. at 39. 
148 See Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, and 
the Concept of Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79, 89-90 (2004) (comparing the 42% 
African-American population in Wayne County, which contains Detroit, with the 21% 
African-American population of the Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division). 
149 The purposes of the fair cross-section requirement are threefold: (1) “to guard against 
the exercise of arbitrary power” and invoke “the commonsense judgment of the community 
as a hedge against the overzealous or mistaken prosecutor”; (2) to preserve “public 
confidence in the fairness of the criminal justice system”; and (3) to share “the 
administration of justice” as “a phase of civic responsibility.”  Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 
522, 530-31 (1975). 
150 Duren v. Mississippi, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 
151 See, e.g., Peter A. Detre, A Proposal for Measuring Underrepresentation in the 
Composition of The Jury Wheel, 103 YALE L.J. 1913, 1921 (1994) (noting criticism of the 
“absolute disparity” metric to assess levels of underrepresentation); see also Green, 389 F. 
Supp. 2d at 50 (criticizing the fair cross-section cases for measuring underrepresentation 
using “something of a contrivance, a normative determination of how much disparity is too 
much,” and stating that “there should not be a magic number”). 
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distinctive group to respond to jury summonses, for example), the very 
decision which accounts for a significant portion of the disparity—the 
decision of the United States Attorney to charge the case federally—is not 
part of the analysis.152  Of course, a defendant might attempt to establish a 
claim under equal protection that the choice of forum was motivated in part 
by the desire of the United States Attorney to obtain a racially stilted 
jury,153 but this claim requires proof of intentional discrimination, whereas a 
prima facie case under the Sixth Amendment may be established by proof 
that a particular method of jury selection has a disparate impact on 
distinctive groups within the community.154  As discussed, in order to 
succeed, a defendant would need to show that the United States Attorney 
violated his or her equal protection rights by engaging in intentional 
discrimination or relied intentionally on impermissible factors—in this 
instance, that the decision to charge the crime federally was motivated in 
part by a desire to obtain an all-white jury.155 
*  *  * 
The constitutional doctrines discussed above did not develop in 
anticipation of the contemporary landscape of federal criminal jurisdiction 
 
152 In United States v. Green, the district court confronted the question of whether the 
jury drawn for the capital trial of the defendants in the Eastern Division of the District of 
Massachusetts violated the Sixth Amendment.  389 F. Supp. 2d at 29.  The court, citing the 
statistics concerning the size of African-American populations in the relevant state and 
federal jury pools as well as the rate of return on jury summonses in federal court, found 
nonetheless that a Sixth Amendment challenge could not be sustained.  Id. at 38.  In so ruling 
the district court judge noted that  because “defendants 1) cannot prove the magnitude of the 
disparity that the First Circuit has thus far required, although they have proved substantial 
disparity, and 2) cannot prove the precise extent to which that disparity is attributable to 
flaws in the system itself, although they have proved that official action and inaction 
contributes to the problem, I am obliged to deny their constitutional challenges.”  Id.  The 
court went on to read the Jury Selection and Service Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1861-1869, to set the 
bar higher than the Sixth Amendment in imposing an affirmative obligation on districts to 
use a jury selection process that ensures a fair cross-section of the community.  Green, 389 
F. Supp. 2d at 63-75.  The First Circuit reversed.  See In re United States, 426 F.3d 1 (1st 
Cir. 2005). 
153 Cf. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 42 n.20 (“Defendants have not argued that the 
government chose a federal forum precisely to affect the racial composition of the jury, an 
argument that may well raise Equal Protection concerns.”). 
154 Compare Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 208-09 (1965) (finding that a 10% 
disparity in representation of a minority group in a jury is insufficient to prove intentional 
discrimination required for equal protection claim), with Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 
526-33 (1975) (finding a Sixth Amendment violation based on systemic underrepresentation 
of women in jury pool without requiring showing of intentional discrimination). 
155 Cf. Green, 389 F. Supp. 2d at 42 n.20 (“Defendants have not argued that the 
government chose a federal forum precisely to affect the racial composition of the jury, an 
argument that may well raise Equal Protection concerns.”). 
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and increasing federal and state cooperation in law enforcement and 
criminal prosecution.  As a consequence, each government can accomplish, 
acting in tandem, what it could not when acting alone.  These conditions 
allow for the subversion or avoidance of constitutional limitations on 
governmental power and their corresponding safeguards for individuals.  
These constitutional doctrines do not grapple with and address the realities 
of concurrent criminal jurisdiction within our dual government. 
In sum, criminal defendants experience an on-the-ground reality that is 
starkly different than the operative backdrop against which these doctrines 
developed.  That dual sovereignty results in multiple prosecutions, 
escalating sentences, and a subversion of individual rights that cuts against 
a fundamental and founding precept of federalism—that by vesting the 
power conferred by the people in two spheres of government, state and 
federal, “a double security arises to the rights of the people.”156 
IV.  CAPITAL POLICYMAKING AND INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITIES 
This section examines the institutional capacity of the federal 
government as a criminal justice policymaker.  Part IV.A identifies 
structural features that distinguish the federal government from the states 
and that have bearing on how the former enacts criminal justice legislation.  
These factors include the size and heterogeneity of the territory within the 
federal government’s jurisdiction, the limited nature of the federal 
government’s police power, and a decreased sensitivity to the cost of 
criminal justice legislation.  These factors dictate that Congress as a 
criminal justice policymaker is less able than states to aggregate preferences 
in writing criminal laws and sustaining a dynamic connection between 
public values and criminal justice policy. 
These institutional features and limitations have particular relevance to 
the ability of the federal government to formulate a coherent and 
constitutional death penalty scheme.  The death penalty is not like other 
sentences, and the Eighth Amendment requires that the legislature put forth 
a rational statutory scheme that ensures that the death penalty will only be 
available for a subset of murderers—the worst of the worst.157  Furthermore, 
 
156 THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James Madison); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 
549, 576 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Though on the surface the idea may seem 
counterintuitive, it was the insight of the Framers that freedom was enhanced by the creation 
of two governments, not one.”); THE FEDERALIST No. 28 (Alexander Hamilton). 
157 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, No. 07-343 (U.S. June 25, 2008) (“Confirmed by 
repeated, consistent rulings of this Court . . . [the] use of the death penalty [must] be 
restrained.  The rule of evolving standards of decency with specific marks on the way to full 
progress and mature judgment means that the resort to the [death] penalty must be reserved 
for the worst of crimes and limited in its instances of application.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
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the “evolving standards of decency” to which the Eighth Amendment is 
keyed suggest that legislatures engage in a dynamic and ongoing calibration 
of their death penalty regime.  For the reasons discussed below in Part 
IV.C, the states are institutionally better suited to maintaining a sustained 
dialogue regarding criminal justice policy, as recent history bears out. 
Given the overlap of federal and state criminal laws, it may be 
tempting to view federal and state governments as similar or even fungible 
actors.  However, this would be a mistake.  The federal government and the 
respective states have very different attributes and responsibilities with 
respect to criminal justice.  Each political unit has the ability to make 
certain policy choices regarding criminal justice, from legislating against 
certain conduct to allocating resources for law enforcement and 
punishment.  Likewise, each political unit has the ability to subscribe to a 
certain rationale for punishment and to determine the overall degree of 
punitiveness with which it metes out criminal sanctions.  At issue in this 
section is not that the states and the federal government might strike this 
balance differently, particularly with respect to capital punishment, but 
rather the process by which that balance is reached.  This Part argues that 
the states are significantly better suited to reach policy decisions that are 
genuinely reflective of the body politic’s preferences regarding whether the 
death penalty should be available in any case and, when it is to be available, 
which class of murderers represents the “worst of the worst.” 
A.  SPECIFIC CHALLENGES DUE TO SIZE AND HETEROGENEITY 
OF THE JURISDICTION 
The first structural feature that distinguishes the federal government 
from the states as a criminal justice actor is perhaps the most obvious—the 
federal government must write laws that are generally applicable across the 
entirety of the vastly varied nation.  The experiences of states and the 
federal government in formulating and implementing determinate 
sentencing systems over the last several decades provide a useful 
illustration of the special challenges that arise given the size and 
heterogeneity of the territory over which the federal government legislates. 
Many jurisdictions, including the federal government, have 
implemented determinate sentencing schemes or guidelines in order to 
 
U.S. 153, 187 (1976) (reasoning that in extreme cases, where a crime is “so grievous an 
affront to humanity[,] the only adequate response may be the penalty of death”); Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 294 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (“[I]t is highly implausible that 
only the worst criminals or the criminals who commit the worst crimes are selected for this 
punishment.”). 
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achieve uniformity and rationality in sentencing.158  Guidelines systems, 
which are now only constitutional if strictly advisory,159 rely on a rank 
ordering of offenses and a system for evaluating the characteristics of the 
offender.  When combined, these two considerations form a matrix that 
assigns incrementally harsher punishments for incrementally “worse” 
offenses. 
Just as capital policymaking requires a judgment about which types of 
offenses qualify as among the worst and thus ought to be eligible to be 
punished by death, jurisdictions enacting guideline systems need to address 
the relative seriousness of the range of criminal offenses.  One of the first 
tasks facing the United States Sentencing Commission was to rank order the 
list of crimes in the United States Code according to the relative harm they 
caused and therefore the relative harshness in sentence length each crime 
ought to carry.  This was particularly challenging for the federal 
government.  Whereas states, with their smaller size and relative 
homogeneity of population, might, through shared political traditions or 
common experience, reach a consensus on such an issue, no such 
homogeneity of preference can be discerned within the nation as a whole.160 
For the United States Sentencing Commission, the attempt to rank 
order crimes resulted in an overall increase in punishments.  Justice Breyer 
explained the unfolding of a process that led not to a coherent rationale or 
theory of punishment, but to an overall ratcheting up of punishment across 
the board.  As he described, the Commission 
may first accept the singular view of Commissioner A, who believes that 
environmental crimes are particularly serious; later, the group would strongly address 
the criminal conduct which Commissioner B finds repugnant; then the Commission 
would turn the floor over to Commissioner C, who feels strongly about some other set 
of crimes.”161   
 
158 See generally Douglas A. Berman & Steven L. Chanenson, The Real (Sentencing) 
World: State Sentencing in the Post-Blakeley Era, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 27 (2006); Richard 
S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 1190 (2005). 
159 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S 220 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 
296 (2004). 
160 Before he sat on the Supreme Court, Justice Breyer observed that “Minnesotans may 
agree, for example, that building new prisons is undesirable or impractical; they may be 
willing to tailor prison sentences to create a total prison population of roughly consonant 
size.  There is no such consensus, however, throughout the nation as a whole.”  See Stephen 
G. Breyer, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Which They 
Rest, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1988).  To illustrate his point, Justice Breyer cites 
conflicting testimony before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, of Margaret Giari, 
arguing against the construction of additional prisons, and of Congressman George W. 
Gekas, arguing in favor of building bigger and better jails.  Id. at 4 n.18. 
161 See id. at 15. 
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The Commission abandoned any attempt to rationally order criminal 
offenses according to their respective “badness,” instead basing their grid 
on average past practice, culled from an analysis of ten thousand actual 
cases.162 
Two points about this are relevant.  First is the difficulty faced by a 
national body in aggregating or ascertaining preferences in relation to 
criminal justice policy across the entire nation.  This difficulty renders the 
federal government at a disadvantage, compared to the states, in rationally 
and coherently selecting the category of crimes that are subject to capital 
punishment.  Even if Congress had the capacity to assess accurately 
national sentiment in relation to the death penalty, the existence of such a 
sentiment is belied by the current patchwork landscape of capital 
punishment.  As has recently been observed, “the United States is not 
monolithic in its death penalty practices.”163  At the state level, it is not a 
simple question of whether the state has the death penalty or does not.  In 
reality there are three categories: states without the death penalty, states 
with the death penalty but insignificant numbers of executions, and states 
with both the death penalty in law and in practice.164 
Furthermore, it may be too simplistic to assume that an opinion on the 
death penalty, as reflected by state legislation and local practice, translates 
perfectly in the aggregate to nationwide support for, or rejection of, the 
federal death penalty.  An individual might have differing criminal justice 
preferences in relation to his state versus the federal government.  
Distinctions surely exist, in the public’s view, between the appropriateness 
of the death penalty for crimes that fall within the core of federal concern—
crimes that target the United States qua the United States or concern 
territories or borders; crimes of international terrorism; or crimes that are 
beyond the capacity of any one state to prosecute—and the appropriateness 
of the death penalty in relation to all instances in which it is legally 
available under federal law.  So while nationwide support might exist for a 
national death penalty to be used against those who commit, for example, 
terrorist acts aimed at undermining the federal government, it is not 
necessarily true that the public supports the federal death penalty for 
garden-variety murder. 
Second, the Sentencing Commission demonstrated the tendency, in the 
absence of discernable preferences, to elevate punitiveness across the board.  
This is out of step with the general trend of constitutional jurisprudence 
 
162 See id. at 8; see also U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.3 (2009). 
163 Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, A Tale of Two Nations: Implementation of the 
Death Penalty in “Executing” Versus “Symbolic” States in the United States, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 1869, 1870 (2006). 
164 Id. 
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surrounding the death penalty, which calls for increasingly finer distinctions 
and narrowing determinations to be made with respect to that punishment.  
Although one cannot analogize from the experience of the Sentencing 
Commission to the practice of Congress in writing criminal laws and setting 
punishment in general, there are other structural features, discussed below, 
which render Congress at a higher risk for writing hortatory and harsh 
criminal laws than the states. 
B.  EFFECT OF THE LACK OF PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR GENERAL 
LAW ENFORCEMENT ON CONGRESS AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
ACTOR 
Another structural feature with important implications for the way in 
which the federal government functions as a criminal justice actor is the 
limited nature of its police power.  Given that the vast majority of crimes 
are punished by state authorities,165 it is more likely that citizens hold their 
local and state-level representatives responsible for maintaining general law 
and order, and are cognizant of or reliant on federal law enforcement only 
in cases that fall in the interstices of state power,166 or for crimes in which 
the United States qua the United States is a victim.167 
The fact that the states remain the primary enforcers of criminal law 
stands to have a distorting effect on the federal government as a criminal 
justice actor.  In cases where the federal government does not risk suffering 
in the eyes of the people for failing to maintain general law and order, 
members of Congress nonetheless may gain by enacting criminal legislation 
that is responsive to a particularly outrageous or high-profile type of 
criminal behavior.  Criminal legislation allows politicians to appear “tough 
on crime” without internalizing any of the costs of administering the law—
appropriation does not necessarily accompany criminalization—and in the 
end, the general populace still relies on local and state governments for day-
 
165 See supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining incidences of federal murder 
prosecutions); see also ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 18 (“Due to limited 
resources—investigative personnel, federal prosecutors, and court facilities—federal 
criminal law can realistically respond to only a relatively small number of local crimes at 
any given time.”). 
166 See, e.g., INTERSTATE COMM’N ON CRIME, HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME 114 
(1938) (praising the National Bank Robbery Statute for rendering “flight” from prosecution 
more difficult). 
167 See Sara Sun Beale, Federalizing Crime: Assessing the Impact on the Federal Courts, 
543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 39, 40 (1996) (noting that early federal offenses, 
including treason, bribery of federal officials, perjury in federal court, and theft of 
government property “dealt with injury to or interference with the federal government itself 
or its programs”). 
186 EILEEN M. CONNOR [Vol. 100 
to-day law enforcement.168  Thus, “the impetus for [a federal criminal law] 
derives from public discomfort about the offense at a time of intense 
publicity.”169  This reactionary tendency of federal criminal law has been 
evident from the passage of the Lindbergh Law170 through the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act171 and beyond.  In practice, Congress 
“typically enacts broad criminal statutes that satisfy the public’s desire to 
‘do something’ about crime yet avoid the hard political choices that more 
specificity implicates.”172  The hard political choices often come with face-
 
168 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1276, 1294 (2005) (“[S]entencing legislation is often passed as a symbolic gesture of 
concern for a particular high profile incident . . ..”); Michael A. Simons, Prosecutorial 
Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines: A Case Study in Controlling Federalization, 75 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 893, 897-98 (2000) (arguing Congress deserves blame for over-
federalization of criminal law because interest group support for new criminal legislation 
often makes federalization irresistible to federal lawmakers).  Professor Barkow also speaks 
of the “availability heuristic,” by which people estimate how frequently an event occurs 
based on how easy it is to recall the event, and the impact of this cognitive phenomenon on 
the public demand for criminal justice legislation that is responsive to sensational or 
newsworthy crime.  Barkow, supra, at 1284-94.  
169 Franklin E. Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis for Federal 
Criminal Legislation, 543 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 15, 20 (1996).  Zimring and 
Hawkins identify the federal carjacking statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2006), as an example of 
such a proposal because “[t]he behavior that constitutes carjacking is punishable in all fifty 
states, and increasingly, states are defining carjacking as a separate substantive offense.” Id.; 
see also ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 14-15 (“New crimes are often enacted 
in patchwork response to newsworthy events, rather than as part of a cohesive code 
developed in response to an identifiable federal need.”). 
170 Congress adopted the federal kidnapping statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006), in 
response to the kidnapping of the infant son of Charles Lindbergh and the public’s “seriou[s] 
concer[n] about the mounting incidence of professional kidnapping and the apparent 
inability of state and local authorities to cope with the interstate aspects of the problem.”  
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 589 n.34 (1968); see also Colin V. Ram, Note, 
Regulating Intrastate Crime: How the Federal Kidnapping Act Blurs the Distinction 
Between What Is Truly National and What Is Truly Local, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 767 
(2008). 
171 See President’s Statement on Signing the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty 
Act of 1996, 32 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 719, 721 (Apr. 24, 1996) (remarking on 
legislation created in response to the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City); 
Bryan A. Stevenson, The Politics of Fear and Death: Successive Problems in Capital 
Federal Habeas Corpus Cases, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 699, 701 (2002). 
172 Simons, supra note 168, at 929.  Simons elaborates, “Even if it were possible to draft 
a statute detailed and specific enough to cover only the precise conduct warranting 
federalization, the opportunity costs involved in such an effort and the difficulty in reaching 
agreement on the exact goals of the legislation remain formidable barriers . . . .  [T]he more 
detailed a criminal statute is, the more difficult it will be to obtain a legislative consensus on 
the policy underlying the statute . . . .  The end result is that Congress paints with a broad 
brush, establishing only the minimum criteria for a crime.”  Id. at 929-30. 
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to-face accountability and with the considerations of cost against a 
backdrop of scarcity. 
Because the federal government is not responsible for administering a 
general and comprehensive criminal justice regime, it may be freer in its 
criminal law enactments.  For example, the federal death penalty may be 
available in instances where the theory of liability is felony-murder, rather 
than intentional murder.173  In general, allowing the death penalty to apply 
beyond intentional murder will mean a significant increase in the number of 
potential capital prosecutions in a jurisdiction.  Whereas a state might factor 
in the cost of bringing unintentional murders within the ambit of its death 
penalty statute, Congress does not similarly consider that the overall 
number of capital prosecutions will increase significantly based on its 
actions, because the overall pool of federal criminal justice resources 
remains the same.174  The intent of Congress in enacting legislation that, for 
example, makes the death penalty available for kidnapping felony murder175 
or bank robbery felony murder176 was not necessarily to alter dramatically 
the number of federal death penalty prosecutions by pressing the reach of 
the regime beyond intentional murders.  A second consequence of the 
limited police power possessed by the federal government is that Congress 
often must legislate against crime in an indirect manner.177  For example, 
the United States may not directly prohibit first-degree murder simplicitur, 
except in those places subject to its maritime or territorial jurisdiction.  
Thus, within 18 U.S.C. § 1111, which describes the crimes of first and 
second degree murder, is a punishment provision that references other 
crimes that Congress may directly proscribe under its commerce power.178  
This circuitous relationship to the crimes at issue may make more difficult a 
frank political dialogue about the relative harms caused by different 
criminal behavior, as well as the situations in which capital punishment 
might be appropriate.  The link between the crime, the power of the 
government to punish, and the duty of the government to protect the 
citizenry against the criminal conduct is substantially more direct and 
transparent at the state level than it is at the federal level. 
 
173 The federal death penalty statute codifies the intent required by Enmund v. Florida, 
458 U.S. 782 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987), for non-triggermen at 21 
U.S.C. § 848(n)(1)(A)-(D) (2006).  
174 See supra Part IV.A. 
175 18 U.S.C. § 1201. 
176 Id. § 2113(e). 
177 See supra Part IV.A. 
178 Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 596-97 n.6 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(citing early federal criminal statutes and cases for proposition that Congress has “no general 
right to punish murder committed within any of the States” (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 19 
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 426 (1821))). 
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Finally, as a result of the limited nature of its police power, the federal 
government has fewer theories under which it may rationally enact penal 
legislation than do the states.  The infrequency with which the federal death 
penalty is applied weakens its capacity to serve as a deterrent.179  
Furthermore, the full extent of federal criminal law—and the 
correspondingly broad applicability of the federal death penalty—is not 
well understood by the general public.  That federal prosecutions are 
initiated in only a small percentage of instances in which a federal law has 
been broken180 only serves to reinforce the public impression that federal 
police power is limited rather than comprehensive, and targeted only at 
offenses that are exceptional in their national importance.  However, the 
reality, as noted by numerous legal scholars, the federal courts, and other 
observers, is that federal criminal law reaches behavior that is well outside a 
core of obvious federal concern.181  These reasons caution, therefore, that 
under the “rational actor” theory of deterrence, the ability of federal law to 
create either specific or general deterrence is weak. 
While deterrence is not the only theory under which legislatures may 
rationally enact criminal laws, it has played a special role in upholding the 
validity of the death penalty against Eighth Amendment challenges.  When 
the Supreme Court reinstated the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia, a key 
finding was that the punishment could not be said to be cruel and unusual 
given that legislatures might legitimately conclude that the punishment had 
some social utility as a deterrent of crime.182  The Court deferred to “the 
legislatures” on the “complex factual issue” of whether the death penalty 
deters crime, trusting them to “evaluate the results of statistical studies in 
terms of their own local conditions and with a flexibility of approach that is 
not available to the courts.”183  It seems clear from the context of this quote 
that the Court had in mind state legislatures.  For the reasons discussed 
above, deterrence does not seem to have particular relevance to the validity 
 
179 This limitation applies to federal criminal law in general.  See ABA TASK FORCE 
REPORT, supra note 15, at 22 (”[R]are use of many federalization statutes calls into question 
the belief that federalization can have a meaningful impact on street safety and local crime”). 
180 See, e.g., DOJ STATISTICAL SURVEY, supra note 13, at 4. 
181 See, e.g., Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Federal Interest in Criminal Law, 47 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1127, 1128-31 (1997) (recognizing that federal jurisdiction, concerning 
the power of the federal government to enact criminal law, is broader than federal interest to 
be vindicated by such legislation). 
182 428 U.S. 153, 185-86 (1975). 
183 Id.; see also Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 478-49 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part) (“A majority of the Court has concluded that the general 
deterrence rationale adequately justifies the imposition of capital punishment . . . .  However, 
in reaching this conclusion we have stated that this is a judgment peculiarly within the 
competence of legislatures.”). 
2010] INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 189 
of the federal death penalty, even if the national legislature were capable of 
using a flexible approach to study local conditions. 
C.  EFFECT OF LACK OF COST-SENSITIVITY ON THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT AS A CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACTOR 
In addition to those mentioned above, another institutional feature that 
distinguishes the federal government from the state as a criminal justice 
actor is that Congress is less sensitive to cost.  As a general matter, states, 
unlike the federal government, cannot print money or otherwise manipulate 
currency.  Furthermore, most state governments are required by statute or 
by constitution to balance the budget, and deficit spending is likewise 
generally not an option for states.184  It is also the case that the cost of 
corrections comprises a significant portion of state budgets—6% of the 
general funds of all states in the aggregate.185 
Here again the experiences of the states and the federal government 
with sentencing guideline systems provide useful examples of the 
respective cost-sensitivity of these actors.  The guideline systems of states 
generally possess one critical attribute lacking in the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines: state sentencing bodies are often explicitly required to consider 
cost and correctional resources when establishing their guidelines.186  For 
example, Kansas was one of the first states to adopt a guidelines system.  
Senate Bill 50, adopted in 1989, created the Kansas Sentencing 
Commission (Commission), and charged it with “[d]evelop[ing] a 
sentencing guideline model or grid based on fairness and equity and . . . 
provid[ing] a mechanism for linking justice and corrections policies.”187  In 
developing this model, the Commission was directed by the legislature to 
“take into substantial consideration current sentencing and release practices 
and correctional resources, including but not limited to the capacities of 
local and state correctional facilities.”188  Any recommendations by the 
Commission must include a report on the impact of the proposed guidelines 
on the state’s prison population, corrections programs, and a study of ways 
to “more effectively utilize correction dollars and to reduce prison 
 
184 See Barkow, supra note 168, at 1290. 
185 See id. 
186 See id. at 1288 (“Most state sentencing commissions are required to produce resource 
impact statements or fiscal notes that alert the legislature to how a particular sentencing 
proposal will affect corrections resources.”).  Virginia’s sentencing commission must 
provide economic impact statements for any proposed sentencing legislation, and the 
legislation cannot go to the floor until the bill’s sponsor secures revenue for the initiative.  
Id. 
187 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-9101(b)(1) (2008). 
188 Id. 
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population.”189  The Commission is further charged with providing the 
legislature with inmate population figures annually, and when the projected 
population exceeds capacity, the Commission must propose specific options 
for reducing the number of prison admissions or adjusting sentence lengths 
for certain groups of offenders.190 
In contrast, the Sentencing Reform Act, which created the United 
States Sentencing Commission, did not set any fiscal impact imperatives.  
Although, according to now-Justice Stephen Breyer, an original member of 
the Commission, a “prison-impact study” was commissioned,191 its results 
were wildly incorrect.  Using twenty different assumptions, the study 
predicted that the federal prison population under the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines would differ from what it would be in the absence of the 
Guidelines by anywhere from negative 2% to positive 10%.192  Data 
indicate that between 1995 and 2003—years in which the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines were in effect—the federal prison population 
increased by 81%.193  Although there are indications that the increase in 
prison population is attributable largely to the harshness of drug sentences 
under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines—between 1992 and 2002, the 
average sentence for a drug offense increased by 31%, and in 2003 a full 
third (34.4%) of the federal prison population was comprised of first time, 
nonviolent offenders194—the important point for this analysis is that the 
federal sentencing system, unlike most of those in the states, contained no 
requirement that sentencing policy choices be accountable or in any way 
dynamic in relation to correctional resources. 
Because an institution is bound by cost does not in and of itself mean 
that a jurisdiction will reach better criminal justice policies and outcomes.  
It does mean, however, that the debate regarding those policies will be more 
sustained and ongoing and thus more likely to reflect reasoned 
 
189 Id. § 74-9101(b)(6). 
190 Id. § 74-9101(b)(15). 
191 See Breyer, supra note 160, at 24. 
192 Id. 
193 THE SENT’G PROJECT, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION: A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 1-
2 (2004), available at http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/ 
inc_federalprisonpop.pdf (relying on BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SURVEY OF INMATES IN STATE AND FEDERAL CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES (1997); BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2003 (2004); BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2002 
(2004); BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPENDIUM OF FEDERAL 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1994 (1998); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, FIFTEEN YEARS OF GUIDELINES 
SENTENCING (2004); U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, 2002 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING 
STATISTICS (2003); U.S.  SENT’G COMM’N, COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY 
(2002)). 
194 Id. at 1. 
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contemporary values.  This is precisely the type of ongoing calibration of 
“evolving standards of decency” from which the Eighth Amendment draws 
its meaning.195 
There is ample evidence that states, unlike the federal government, are 
currently engaged in searching reviews of various aspects of their death 
penalty systems.  Concurring in the Supreme Court’s recent consideration 
of the constitutionality of lethal injection protocols, Justice Stevens 
suggested that “[t]he time for a dispassionate, impartial comparison of the 
enormous costs that death penalty litigation imposes on society with the 
benefits that it produces has certainly arrived.”196  His suggestion was as 
much descriptive as prescriptive.  Among states with the death penalty,197 a 
significant number have undertaken a process to reevaluate the merits of 
continuing the practice.  In the past several years, the legislatures of 
Arizona,198 California,199 Connecticut,200 Illinois,201 Indiana,202 Kansas,203 
 
195 See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958). 
196 Baze v. Rees, 128 S. Ct. 1520, 1548-49 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
197 Currently, thirty-five states authorize the death penalty by statute.  The District of 
Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, 
New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin do not.  
See DEBORAH FINS, NAACP LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATIONAL FUND, DEATH ROW 
U.S.A. 1 (2008), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/ 
DRUSA_Winter_2008.pdf. 
198 Arizona Attorney General Janet Napolitano formed the Attorney General’s Capital 
Case Commission in 2000 to “study key issues and make recommendations to try to ensure 
that the death penalty process in Arizona is just, timely, and fair to defendants and victims.”  
See OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., STATE OF ARIZ., CAPITAL CASE COMMISSION FINAL REPORT 1 
(2002), available at http://www.azag.gov/CCC/FinalReport.html.  The study was not 
commissioned by the legislature, but members of the commission included members of the 
Arizona legislature, as well as prosecutors, defense attorneys, trial and appellate judges, 
victims’ rights advocates, and citizens.  Id. 
199 California Senate Resolution 44 created the California Commission on the Fair 
Administration of Justice and charged it with studying a variety of criminal justice issues, 
including the death penalty system.  S.R. 44, 2003-04 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004).  The final 
report of the Commission with respect to the death penalty concluded that the system was 
dysfunctional and required immediate legislative attention in several key areas.  See CAL. 
COMM’N ON THE FAIR ADMIN. OF JUST., REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE FAIR 
ADMINISTRATION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CALIFORNIA 3-4 (2008) (hereinafter CALIFORNIA 
REPORT), available at http://www.ccfaj.org/rr-dp-official.html. 
200 In 2001, the General Assembly of Connecticut created a commission to study 
fourteen specific aspects of the death penalty in that state, including the existence of 
disparities in its application based on race, ethnicity, or jurisdiction, and its cost.  See STATE 
OF CONN. COMM’N ON THE DEATH PENALTY, STUDY PURSUANT TO PUBLIC ACT NO. 01-151 OF 
THE IMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN CONNECTICUT 1-2 (2003), available at 
http://www.cga.ct.gov/olr/Death%20Penalty%20Commission%20Final%20Report.pdf. 
201 In 2000, an executive order of the Governor of Illinois created the Commission on 
Capital Punishment, and charged it with studying several aspects of the death penalty with 
special attention to the need for greater procedural safeguards.  See REPORT OF THE 
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Maryland,204 Nevada,205 New Jersey,206 New York,207 North Carolina,208 
Tennessee,209 and Virginia210 have ordered commissions to study aspects of 
 
GOVERNOR’S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2002), available at 
http://www.idoc.state.il.us/ccp/ccp/reports/commission_report/complete_report.pdf.  The 
Governor’s Commission succeeded the House Death Penalty Task Force, which declined to 
issue a formal report.  Id. at 1. 
202 In 2002, at the request of the Governor and the General Assembly, the Indiana 
Criminal Justice Institute studied the costs and racial dynamics, among other things, of the 
death penalty in Indiana.  IND.A CRIM. JUST. INST., THE APPLICATION OF INDIANA’S CAPITAL 
SENTENCING LAW: FINDINGS OF THE INDIANA CRIMINAL LAW STUDY COMMISSION (2002), 
available at http://www.in.gov/cji/files/law_book.pdf. 
203 Under the Kansas Governmental Operations Accountability Law, two Kansas state 
senators requested in 2003 that a special audit commission study the costs of capital 
punishment to state and local units of government.  See STATE OF KAN. LEG. DIV. OF POST 
AUDIT, PERFORMANCE AUDIT REPORT: COSTS INCURRED FOR DEATH PENALTY CASES: A K-
GOAL AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.kslegislature.org/postaudit/audits_perform/04pa03a.pdf.  The report estimated 
the costs of a death penalty case to be 70% more than the cost of a comparable non-death 
case.  Id. at 11.  In 2004, the Kansas Judicial Council studied specific aspects of the death 
penalty, including the existence of geographical and racial disparities in the penalty’s 
application, the existence of legal protections for the wrongly convicted, and the existence of 
a general deterrent effect under the death penalty. See Report of the Kansas Judicial Council 
Death Penalty Advisory Committee on Certain Issues Related to the Death Penalty 6 (2004), 
available at http://www.kscourts.org/pdf/studies/death_penalty_rpt11-12-04.pdf. 
204 On May 13, 2008, Governor Martin O’Malley signed into law Senate Bill 614, 
thereby creating the Maryland Commission on Capital Punishment.  S. 614, 2008 Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Md. 2008), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2008rs/chapters_noln/ 
Ch_430_sb0614E.pdf.  The Commission is charged with studying “all aspects of capital 
punishment as currently and historically administered” and with making “recommendations 
concerning the application and administration of capital punishment in the state so that they 
are free from bias and error and achieve fairness and accuracy.”  Id. 
205 Created in 2007, Nevada’s Advisory Commission on the Administration of Justice, 
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.0123 (West Supp. 2009), undertook a study of the cost of 
administering the death penalty in the state.  See Cy Ryan, Death Penalty a Costly 
Proposition, L.V. SUN, July 9, 2008, at 3. 
206 The New Jersey legislature created a commission to assess the merits of the death 
penalty and determine whether its continued use was justified.  Act of Jan. 12, 2006, ch. 321, 
2005 N.J. Laws 2165.  The commission issued its final report in January 2007.  See N.J. 
DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMM’N, NEW JERSEY DEATH PENALTY STUDY COMMISSION REPORT 
(2007) (hereinafter NEW JERSEY REPORT), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/ 
committees/dpsc_final.pdf.  The legislature adopted the Commission’s recommendation, and 
abolished the death penalty on December 17, 2007.  Act of Dec. 17, 2007, ch. 204, 2007 N.J. 
Laws 1427. 
207 In the wake of People v. LaValle, 817 N.E. 2d 341 (N.Y. 2004), a decision by the 
state’s high court that struck as unconstitutional the state’s death penalty statute, the chairs of 
three standing committees of the Assembly—the Committee on Codes, the Committee on 
the Judiciary, and the Committee on Corrections—held a series of five public hearings in 
order to “review New York’s death penalty statute in all of its dimensions and solicit the 
widest range of views possible before considering” whether to restore the death penalty.  See 
N.Y. STATE ASSEMBLY, THE DEATH PENALTY IN NEW YORK 1 (2005), available at 
2010] INFLUENCE OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 193 
their death penalty systems.  Some studies have focused on the error rate 
and protective process afforded to those wrongfully convicted; some have 
asked searching questions about deterrence, retribution, and the overarching 
moral justifications for the death penalty; and others have additionally 
focused on the pragmatic question of cost.211  Some commentators have 
noted a shift in the debate over the death penalty toward a frank 
consideration of cost.212 
 
http://assembly.state.ny.us/comm/Codes/20050403/deathpenalty.pdf.  The committees 
undertook “to review whether the death penalty should be enacted not only through the 
prism of our moral, ethical and legal beliefs, but with the benefit of the real-world 
experience which the past nine years of practice in New York has given us.”  Id. at 2.  No 
recommendation was made in the report; the legislature has not acted to reinstate the death 
penalty to date. 
208 The Legislative Research Commission, the general-purpose study group of North 
Carolina’s legislature, undertook a study, through a special committee, on the role of race 
and mental retardation in the state’s death penalty system at the direction of the state senate.  
Studies Act of 1999, Ch. S.L. 1999-395 § 2.1(11)(a)-(b), 1999 N.C. Sess. Laws 1564, 1568.  
The Capital Punishment-Mentally Retarded and Race Basis Committee recommended the 
adoption of legislation barring the death penalty for the mentally retarded and recommended 
that the legislature enact a moratorium on the death penalty for further evaluation of 
potential racial bias in the death penalty’s administration.  See LEG. RES. COMM’N, CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT: MENTALLY RETARDED AND RACE BASIS 27-28 (2001), available at 
http://www.ncga.state.nc.us/gascripts/DocumentSites/browseDocSite.asp?nID=1 (follow 
“Study Reports to the 2001 NCGA” hyperlink; then follow “Legislative Research 
Committee (LRC) Study Reports '01”; then follow “Capital Punishment - Mentally Retarded 
and Race Basis (LRC)”). 
209 In 2007, the Tennessee General Assembly created the Special Committee to Study the 
Administration of the Death Penalty and directed it “to study, receive testimony, deliberate 
upon, and make recommendations for public policy designed to provide fairness and 
accuracy in the application of capital punishment” at “all stages of the capital process.”  Act 
of June 27, 2007, ch. 549, §§ 1-7, 2007 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1.  The creation of this committee 
followed on the heels of a report from the state comptroller, prepared at the request of the 
House Judiciary Committee, finding that the costs of death penalty cases are greater than 
non-death first-degree murder cases.  See OFFICE OF RESEARCH, STATE OF TENN. 
COMPTROLLER OF THE TREAS., TENNESSEE’S DEATH PENALTY: COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES 
48-49 (2004) (hereinafter TENNESSEE REPORT), available at http://www.tba.org/Sections/ 
CriminalJustice/TabD(1).pdf. 
210 In late 2000, the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission unanimously 
recommended the formation of a subcommittee to study capital punishment in Virginia.  See 
JOINT LEG. AUDIT AND REV. COMM’N, VA GEN. ASSEMBLY, REVIEW OF VIRGINIA’S SYSTEM 
OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (2001) (Commission Draft), available at http://jlarc.state.va.us/ 
meetings/December01/capital.pdf.  The Commission focused its inquiry on two elements of 
Virginia’s system: the use of prosecutorial discretion and judicial review of death sentences 
in state courts.  Id. at i. 
211 See, e.g., CALIFORNIA REPORT, supra note 199, at 10. 
212 See, e.g., Steve Mills, States Weigh Cost of Capital Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 
2009, at A15 (“Debate over the death penalty has undergone shifts over the years.  During 
the last decade, the discussion has focused on accuracy and fairness, with exonerations of 
dozens of death row inmates sparking calls for reform and abolition.  Now, with the nation’s 
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This wave of self-study on the part of the states supports the idea that 
states as criminal justice actors are engaged in a dynamic process with 
respect to criminal justice.  Even when a part of this debate is necessitated 
by fiscal concern, the process of regular assessment of the cost of certain 
criminal justice programs surely provides the states with opportunities to 
reaffirm, modify, or disavow prior policy choices.  It is also true that focus 
on an issue such as cost may provide cause for a discussion that evolves 
beyond its original parameters with a salutary effect.  For example, states 
such as Tennessee and New Jersey incorporated discussions of non-
economic costs in their studies of capital punishment, including intangible 
effects on jurors, judges, and family members of the parties.213 
In contrast, cost does not appear to factor into the federal decision 
about whether to charge a case capitally.  In response to a congressional 
request for information about the average and median total cost to the 
federal government of a capital prosecution versus prosecution of the 
defendant on non-capital charges,214 the response under Attorney General 
Ashcroft was that “[t]he Department does not track or attempt to attribute 
specific sums to the capital review process.”215  Indeed, when the national 
 
economy slumping, the issue is cost.”); Editorial, High Cost of Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 28, 2009, at A22 (noting trend of states reexamining death penalty over issue of cost of 
administration). 
213 See TENNESSEE REPORT, supra note 209, at iii-iv (“First-degree murder causes 
emotional stress and pain for jurors, the victim’s family, and the defendant’s family.  
Although any traumatic trial may cause stress, the pressure may be at its peak during capital 
trials.  Jurors serving on traumatic trials are six times more likely to suffer from symptoms of 
depression than jurors serving on non-capital trials.  While many victims’ families seek 
retribution or closure in an execution, others renounce the death penalty as causing more 
suffering to themselves and others.  Defendants’ family members may face shame and social 
isolation from media coverage or health problems from stress related conditions.”).  The 
New Jersey Death Penalty Study Commission specifically considered the psychological and 
emotional costs of capital punishment, including “the adverse effects of executions on third 
parties: judges, jurors, judicial staff, correctional staff, journalists, clergy and spiritual 
advisors, as well as the families of the victim and the families of the condemned inmate.”  
NEW JERSEY REPORT, supra note 206, at 34. 
214 When Attorney General John Ashcroft promulgated the DOJ’s revised policy on 
capital cases, Senator Russ Feingold asked, “What steps does the Department take to track 
the monetary cost to the U.S. Government of seeking the Federal death penalty in death-
eligible cases?  Please provide the average and median total cost (including investigative 
costs) to the Justice Department of seeking the death penalty in death-eligible cases between 
2001 and 2006.  Please also provide information on the average and median total cost 
(including investigative costs) to the Justice Department should an otherwise death-eligible 
case instead be brought as a non-capital case (i.e. where life without parole is sought).”  
Federal Death Penalty Hearing, supra note 34, at 60 (responses of Department of Justice to 
questions submitted by Senator Feingold). 
215 Id. at 60-61. 
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legislature reacted to calls from President George H. W. Bush216 and 
President Bill Clinton217 to reenact and later to expand the federal death 
penalty, the ensuing debates in most instances assumed the legitimacy of 
the penalty, argued for its appropriateness in the instance of certain 
crimes,218 or exhibited a blanket moral opposition to the death penalty.219  
The debate did not focus on the cost or benefit of a death penalty regime 
that would be broadly applicable to almost any murder occurring in the 
United States.220  This is not to say that the federal government engages in 
no review of its criminal justice policies, or that it is completely insensitive 
to cost.221  However, the level of dialogue currently existing at the state 
level is unmatched. 
 
216 President Bush challenged Congress to pass anti-crime legislation, including a 
reinstatement of the federal death penalty, within one hundred days of a March 11, 1991 
address.  See 137 CONG. REC. S18,664-02 (1991) (statement of Sen. Dole). 
217 President Clinton pressured Congress to pass his crime bill, which contained death 
penalty provisions.  See John Aloysius Farrell, Clinton Seeking Public Support for Crime 
Bill, BOST. GLOBE, Aug. 16, 1994, at 3; Christopher Hanson, House Adopts Crime Bill; 
Clinton Forced to Muster GOP Support for Passage, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Aug. 
22, 1994, at A1. 
218 See, e.g., 139 CONG. REC. S2408 (1993) (statement of Sen. D’Amato) (referring to 
recent bombing of the World Trade Center and arguing that “we should have a death penalty 
for these kinds of savage acts”). 
219 See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S2226 (1994) (statement of Sen. Hatfield) (“I oppose the 
death penalty because I believe that government-sponsored killing in all of its forms is 
immoral. . . .  When human beings attempt to take on authority that only our Creator 
possesses they are doomed to failure.”) (augmenting record with statement of Justice 
Blackmun in Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994) (mem.) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari)). 
220 Even when the possible deterrent effects of the death penalty are referenced, it is 
often in support of authorizing the death penalty for a specific offense, rather than in relation 
to the panoply of offenses for which the federal death penalty is available.  See, e.g., 140 
CONG. REC. S1820-01 (1994) (statement of Sen. Hatch).  Senator Hatch invoked the example 
of Aldrich Ames, accused of selling state secrets to the Soviet Union, to argue for the death 
penalty for crimes of treason and espionage: “when a potential turncoat calculates whether 
he will betray his country for profit, the prospect that he or she may be sent to the electric 
chair should be part of his or her calculation.  The death penalty is a strong deterrent to such 
crimes.  For crimes like espionage and treason for profit, the likelihood of such a crime being 
committed will be diminished if the potential punishment includes the death penalty.  This is 
a price some criminals will not want to pay for a new Jaguar.” 
221 For example, the Senate has held a hearing on, among other things, the racial and 
geographical disparities in the federal death penalty system.  See Racial and Geographic 
Disparities in the Federal Death Penalty System: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the 
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th 
Cong. (2001). 
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D.  CONCLUSIONS 
This section does not suggest that the states and federal government 
must have identical concerns in administering criminal justice in general or 
the death penalty in particular.  Quite the opposite.  The differences in 
institutional capacities ought to be recognized, especially in light of the 
different purposes of federal criminal law and state criminal law. 
Although the mode of promulgating state criminal justice legislation is 
by no means free from the same types of interest group pressures that lead 
to an overrepresentation in the national political process of those seeking to 
increase criminal justice penalties,222 the institutional factors discussed 
herein dictate that states are more accountable to the people than is the 
federal government in the realm of criminal justice.  Without suggesting a 
particular outcome with respect to criminal justice or the death penalty, it is 
possible that it may be normatively preferable within our dual federal 
system to allocate especially the most controversial aspects of criminal 
justice administration to the states.  A fundamental principle of our 
constitutional design is that “keeping the government close to the 
individual” will enhance the institutions of representative democracy.223  As 
one scholar noted,  
[S]tates have an abiding interest in defining criminal conduct and in enforcing their 
criminal code.  State criminal law is written and enforced by elected officials who are 
closer to the community than are their federal counterparts.  Consequently, state 
 
222 Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 
349, 378-79 (1974) (terming unwillingness of lawmakers to commit “political suicid[e]” by 
enacting protections for criminals “legislative default”).  However, the confluence of 
legislative hesitancy posited by process theory, and the phenomenon that the majority of 
citizens imagine themselves as the victims (rather than perpetrators) of crime, means that the 
“overwhelming preponderance of political incentives favor unrestricted enforcement of the 
criminal law, even if this means abusive police methods or convicting the innocent.”  Donald 
A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public Choice, 44 
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1081 (1993).  Predicting from this model, one might expect to see 
few substantive or procedural criminal laws, because the benefits of such legislation are 
widely dispersed.  See Dan M. Kahan, Is Chevron Relevant to Criminal Law?, 110 HARV. L. 
REV. 469, 474 (1996).  Process theory posits that legislatures are not sensitive to protecting 
the rights of those accused of crimes.  See Michael J. Klarman, The Puzzling Resistance to 
Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 766 (1991) (arguing that judicial supervision 
of criminal procedure law substitutes for legislative rulemaking because all segments of 
society are not equally likely to come into contact with the criminal justice system).  Public 
choice theory posits that the political process results in overrepresentation of the interests of 
well-organized but non-majoritarian groups in the legislative process.  See generally Cass R. 
Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985). 
223 Lino A. Graglia, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich: Federalism in the Rehnquist Court, 31 
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 761, 761 (2008). 
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criminal law is more likely to reflect the values and mores of state residents than is the 
uniform regulation that results from federal legislation.224 
V.  THE EFFECT OF THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY 
ON STATE ACTORS  
The foregoing section isolated the state and federal governments as 
criminal justice actors and, viewing them in isolation from one another, 
considered variations in their institutional features and the ways in which 
these variations might impact their capacity to set criminal justice policy in 
general and with respect to capital punishment in particular.  However, 
these two levels of government do not operate in isolation from one 
another.  This section examines the impact of the federal death penalty on 
criminal justice actors at the state level.  The potential for federal capital 
prosecution across the nation threatens to seriously undermine the ability of 
states to make reasoned policy choices for the benefit of their citizenry, as 
examined in Part V.A; the ability of local prosecutors to remain accountable 
for their charging decisions, as examined in Part V.B; and the capacity of 
local juries to breathe contemporary values into the substance of the law, as 
examined in Part V.C.  The capacity for obscuring local preferences and 
undermining the role of capital juries is particularly at odds with the Eighth 
Amendment requirement that death sentences be the result of channeled 
discretion and free from arbitrariness or unconstrained emotion. 
Given the relatively small number of federal criminal prosecutions 
annually, the notion that the federal government will dictate capital 
punishment policy across the nation is not realistic.  However, in the 
instigation of virtually every capital trial, there will be numerous occasions, 
discussed infra, in which federal rule will supplant local policies and 
practices.  The absolute number of these instances might today be relatively 
low, yet they are significant in their capacity to weaken accountability of 
state policymakers. 
A.  THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY, DECREASED STATE LEGISLATIVE 
ACCOUNTABILITY, AND THE DISPLACEMENT OF LOCAL 
PREFERENCES 
Even though a primary motivating factor in the centralized capital 
charging policies is the attainment of national uniformity in law 
enforcement,225 in most practical senses this goal is illusory.226  All capital 
 
224 Moohr, supra note 181, at 1172. 
225 See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. 
226 See Gleeson, supra note 37, at 1701-22 (discussing reasons, including prosecutorial 
discretion and regional differences, for persistent disparities in federal sentencing outcomes). 
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trials, even those conducted in federal court by federal prosecutors, will 
have effects that are primarily local.  That crime and its prosecution will 
remain tethered to a specific locality is inscribed in the Constitution.  The 
Sixth Amendment vicinage requirement guarantees that “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law.”227  Current federal law provides for venue in criminal cases “in a 
district where the offense was committed.”228  Thus, the jury will be drawn 
entirely from within the state, and the family members of the victim and 
accused are likely to reside within the state.  The defense lawyers, 
especially if the defendant is indigent, will be drawn from the local 
community within the state, and the judge that hears the case will reside 
within the state.  Likewise, local newspapers and media outlets will cover 
the trial, guaranteeing that the prosecution will be an event in the 
consciousness of state and local residents.  Lastly, federal law requires 
states to carry out the execution of a federal prisoner in certain instances.229 
If a state acts, as have New Jersey and New Mexico, to abolish the 
death penalty, it has reached a policy conclusion that is against the weight 
of special interests and reflects the determination that the death penalty is 
not justifiable in light of its costs.  In the event that the action abolishing (or 
declining to enact or reenact) a death penalty regime was premised on a 
consideration of intangible costs, the state is without recourse should the 
 
227 U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). 
228 FED. R. CRIM. P. 18. 
229 18 U.S.C. § 3596 (a) (2006).  A federal judge rejected a claim that this provision of 
the Federal Death Penalty Act violates the Tenth Amendment.  In United States v. Taveras, 
No. 04-156, 2006 WL 473773 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2006), Judge Weinstein of the Eastern 
District of New York noted that although the Tenth Amendment forbids the 
“commandeering” of state officials into federal service, no New York official had objected 
to assisting the federal government in this manner.  Thus, “[t]he effort of defendant to 
protect an unknown state official against being compelled to carry[] out this grisly duty 
shows a commendable sensitivity and humanity, but establishes no standing.”  Id. at *6.  
Further litigation on this issue may develop, however.  A federal judge has ordered that Gary 
Sampson, convicted of multiple homicides and sentenced to death by the federal 
government, must be executed by New Hampshire state officials.  New Hampshire, which 
has the death penalty but has not carried out an execution since 1939, see New England 
Conducts First Execution Since 1960, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2005, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/13/world/americas/13iht-web.0513execution.html, must 
construct a facility in which to administer lethal injection according to the United States 
government’s protocol.  United States v. Sampson, 300 F. Supp. 2d 278 (D. Mass. 2004) 
(ordering Sampson to be executed in New Hampshire by lethal injection or by hanging, 
pursuant to N.H. REV. STAT ANN § 630:5 (XIII)-(XIV) (2003)); Dan Gorenstein, How to 
Build an Execution Chamber, NEW HAMPSHIRE PUBLIC RADIO, Mar. 18, 2008,  
www://nhpr.org/node/15587. 
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federal government decide to seek death for a crime that occurred within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the state.  By virtue of the Supremacy Clause, the 
federal government may impose a capital punishment regime in states that 
have elected not to have one.  Unlike other areas of federal regulation, 
which coerce state compliance with federal policy initiatives or goals 
through the spending power, the commerce power, or through its powers 
pursuant to Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, the states are not 
free to decline this particular policy initiative.230  When the federal 
government seeks participation in a federal program where “state residents 
would prefer their government to devote its attention and resources to 
problems other than those deemed important by Congress, they may choose 
to have the Federal Government rather than the State bear the expense of a 
federally mandated regulatory program.”231  However, with a federal death 
penalty “program,” costs will always be externalized to some extent on 
local actors, and the states and their citizenry will inevitably bear those 
costs.  This undermines the ability of state governments to “remain 
responsive to the local electorate’s preferences,”232 for ultimately their 
decisions may be overruled by the federal government. 
The presence of the federal death penalty in state jurisdictions may 
decrease state accountability in the opposite direction as well, where the 
state government or local prosecutors may desire to seek the death penalty 
in a specific case or as a general matter, but may not have the authorization 
of state law to do so.  In these instances, the availability of the federal death 
penalty undermines respect for the process by which a political consensus 
on the death penalty was arrived.  Human-on-human killing is an extreme 
violation of the fabric of civil society, and reactions to such an action will 
necessarily be inflected with great emotion.  In the context of our justice 
system, we rely on preexisting rules of law to achieve equitable outcomes 
driven by reason rather than naked emotion; likewise, our democracy is 
premised on the idea that our legislatures will reflect the “cool and 
deliberate sense of the community” rather than ideas or positions 
“stimulated by some irregular passion.”233  We have designed our political 
institutions to protect against instances in which “a number of citizens, 
whether amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole . . . are united 
 
230 Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166-69 (1992).  In the case of such 
federal advances, “the residents of the State retain the ultimate decision as to whether or not 
the State will comply.  If a State’s citizens view federal policy as sufficiently contrary to 
local interests, they may elect to decline a federal grant.”  Id. at 168. 
231 Id. 
232 Id. 
233 THE FEDERALIST No. 63 (James Madison). 
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and actuated by some common impulse of passion . . . adverse . . . to the 
permanent and aggregate interests of the community.”234 
It is often the case that the transient impulse of a community may be in 
favor of the death penalty even when its reasoned position is firmly against 
capital punishment.  As former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales said, in 
relation to his decision to seek the death penalty in federal cases in Vermont 
and North Dakota, neither of which has the death penalty under state law, “I 
believe the fact the state doesn’t have the death penalty doesn’t mean that 
the people of the state would not impose the ultimate sanction when the 
right circumstances dictate that that happen.”235  He was proven right by a 
North Dakota jury, when it returned a verdict of death for Alfonso 
Rodriguez, Jr., convicted of murdering college student Dru Sjodin.236 
The federal prosecution and resulting death sentence registered a sense 
of community outrage over Rodriguez’s crime, but it failed to respect the 
reasoned conclusion of that same community regarding the undesirability of 
the death penalty.  This conclusion has been reaffirmed multiple times by 
North Dakota.  When North Dakota had the death penalty in the early part 
of the twentieth century, the penalty was reserved only for those convicted 
of first-degree murder and who were already serving a life sentence on a 
prior conviction of first-degree murder.237  The state had not carried out an 
execution since 1905, when a hanging was botched; North Dakota only 
carried out eight legal executions as a state.238  The death penalty was taken 
off the books in 1975.239  In 1995, the state legislature considered a bill that 
would have reauthorized the death penalty for the murder of a law 
enforcement or correctional officer, and for murders that occurred in 
relation to kidnapping or rape.240  The bill was introduced in part as a 
response to the particularly heinous and newsworthy murder of Donna 
Martz, whose sister testified before the senate in favor of the measure.241  
 
234 THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison); see also Barkow, supra note 168, at 1296-
97 (citing Madison in Federalist No. 49 for premise that “government should reflect the 
public’s reasoned preferences, not their impulsive ones”). 
235 Dave Kolpack, Attorney General Visits North Dakota Law Officials, ABERDEEN AM. 
NEWS, July 22, 2005, at A7. 
236 See United States v. Rodriguez, No. 04-55, 2007 WL 466752 (D.N.D. Feb. 12, 2007). 
237 Act of Mar. 9, 1915, ch. 63, 1915 N.D. Laws 76. 
238 Frank E. Vyzralek, Legal Execution in Northern Dakota & North Dakota, in N.D. 
HUMANITIES COUNCIL, MORE ABOUT JUSTICE ON THE DAKOTA FRONTIER 8 2000).  
239 Act of Mar. 15, 1973, ch. 116, 1973 N.D. Laws 287 (new criminal code to become 
effective July 1, 1975 listing sentencing alternatives with the maximum possible penalty of 
twenty years imprisonment). 
240 Carter Wood, Senate Kills the Death Penalty, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Jan. 31, 1995, 
at A1. 
241 Id. 
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The bill was defeated by a vote of thirty-three to fourteen; Senator Wayne 
Stenehjem,242 who later was elected Attorney General of North Dakota, led 
the opposition.243  The next time the legislature debated the death penalty 
was in 2003, in response to the murder of Dru Sjodin,244 but it had little 
support even in the face of this heinous crime. 
Certainly, uniform federal law supplants local rule in numerous 
instances by design of our federal system.  However, given the structural 
features and institutional capacities favoring states as criminal justice policy 
actors, there may be good reason to invest state criminal justice policies 
with favor, and to be cautious in relation to federal criminal justice policies 
that unseat them. 
Additionally, the Eighth Amendment is especially concerned with the 
policy judgments made by states in the capital arena, as these judgments 
create the very substance of the Eighth Amendment as it is understood to 
“draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the 
progress of a maturing society.”245  Decisions regarding categorical 
restrictions on the death penalty rendered by the Supreme Court are based 
in part on the way in which states have answered the question for 
themselves.246  If consensus in the states is undermined by the presence of 
 
242 Id.  Senator Stenehjem argued that the death penalty was costly and an unproven 
deterrent of violent crime, and furthermore advised, “We, as individual senators, need to 
weigh, within our own conscience, whether it is appropriate for the state to condone violence 
to show that we will not tolerate violence.”  Id. 
243 Office of Att’y Gen., State of N.D., Biography of Attorney General Stenehjem, 
http://www.ag.state.nd.us/Wayne.htm (last visited .Nov. 17, 2009). 
244 Dale Wetzel, North Dakota May Consider Death Penalty but Support for Bill Is 
Sparse, GRAND FORKS HERALD, Dec. 6, 2003, at A1. 
245 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion). 
246 In Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the Supreme Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment bars the execution of the mentally retarded.  In so holding, the majority noted 
that “[t]he large number of States prohibiting the execution of mentally retarded persons and 
the complete absence of States passing legislation reinstating the power to conduct such 
executions [of the mentally retarded] provides powerful evidence that today our society 
views mentally retarded offenders as categorically less culpable than the average criminal.  
The evidence carries even greater force when it is noted that the legislatures that have 
addressed the issue have voted overwhelmingly in favor of the prohibition.”  Id. at 315-16.  
In Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), the Court held that the Eighth Amendment bars 
execution of those who committed a crime before the age of eighteen.  The majority relied 
on “objective indicia of consensus in this case—the rejection of the juvenile death penalty in 
the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it remains on the books; and the 
consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice” as evidence that “today our society 
views juveniles . . . as ‘categorically less culpable than the average criminal.’”  Id. at 567 
(quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316).  In Kennedy v. Louisiana, the Court ruled that imposition 
of the death penalty for child rape where death did not occur violates the Eighth 
Amendment.  No. 07-343, slip op. at 1 (U.S. June 25, 2008).  There, in ascertaining the 
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the federal death penalty, so too is the ability of states to register their 
norms as part of the evolving substance of the Eighth Amendment.  The 
Supreme Court also looks to the behavior of state juries in locations that 
have the death penalty to ascertain “social consensus” on an Eighth 
Amendment practice.247  It is not clear how death sentences meted out under 
federal law in jurisdictions that do not otherwise have or use the death 
penalty factor into the “social consensus” existing in the state. 
B.  THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY AND DECREASED 
ACCOUNTABILITY OF LOCAL PROSECUTORS 
In states where the death penalty is authorized, a second order of 
policy decisions transpires at the county level.  Decisions about whether to 
seek death in any one case are made by local prosecutors.248  There is strong 
evidence that communities exhibit their preferences regarding the death 
penalty through the selection of the local prosecutor, because even within 
states that allow the death penalty, its use varies dramatically by county.  A 
study in the last decade revealed that only 3% of counties account for 50% 
of the death sentences imposed nationally.249  The federal death penalty 
rests across a patchwork of counties that composes the national fabric, each 
subsidiary unit exercising a degree of autonomy within the overarching 
framework of state law.  The federal death penalty has the capacity to 
override local preferences or undermine the accountability of local 
prosecutors to the communities that elected them. 
A federal death penalty agenda which seeks to initiate capital 
prosecutions in jurisdictions where local prosecutors, such as Robert 
Johnson of the Bronx250 and Kamala Harris of San Francisco,251 have a 
 
existence of a national consensus on the question, the Court found it “of significance that, in 
45 jurisdictions, petitioner could not be executed for child rape of any kind.”  Id. at 15. 
247 See, e.g., Kennedy, No. 07-343, slip op. at 22 (“There are measures of consensus other 
than legislation.  Statistics about the number of executions may inform the consideration 
whether capital punishment for the crime of child rape is regarded as unacceptable in our 
society.”). 
248 See, e.g., Brian P. Janiskee, Prosecutorial Discretion in Death Penalty Cases: 
Democracy in Action, 2 J. INST. ADVANCEMENT CRIM. JUST. 39 (2008) (“Variances in the 
application of the death penalty statute among local jurisdictions by different elected district 
attorneys are a natural and desirable by-product of our constitutional and representative 
democracy.”).  Janiskee further argues, “Because the prosecutor is not under the immediate 
supervision of other local officials, the prosecutor has the discretion to pursue the public 
good as defined by the electoral relationship between this official and his or her constituents.  
These constituencies vary from county to county.”  Id. at 41 (citation omitted). 
249 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 618 (2002) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
250 The conflict between the anti-death penalty policy of District Attorney Johnson and 
the charging practices of the federal government are discussed in relation to the Quinones 
case, supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text. 
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longstanding policy against the death penalty raises questions about the 
nature of the federal interest vindicated by such prosecutions.  As discussed 
in Part II, the United States Attorney Manual recommends federal 
abstention from prosecution when concurrent jurisdiction exists with a 
state, except “when the Federal interest in the prosecution is more 
substantial than the interests of the State or local authorities.”252  One factor 
that bears on the relative interests of the state and federal governments is 
“[t]he relative ability and willingness of the State to prosecute effectively 
and obtain an appropriate punishment upon conviction.”253  Similarly, the 
Petite Policy, which applies where a defendant’s conduct already has 
formed the basis for a state prosecution, precludes federal prosecution based 
on substantially the same acts unless the matter involves a “substantial 
federal interest” that has been left “demonstrably unvindicated” by the 
foregoing prosecution.254  The Department’s presumption that a prior state 
prosecution has vindicated the federal interest “may be overcome even 
when a conviction was achieved in the prior prosecution . . . if the prior 
sentence was manifestly inadequate in light of the federal interest 
involved.”255 
The implication, then, when the United States brings capital charges in 
a district in which the local prosecutor evidences a willingness to pursue 
first-degree murder charges but not the punishment of death, is that there 
are instances in which the only appropriate sentence for a given crime is 
death.  Further, that even in instances in which a defendant has been 
prosecuted by the state, convicted of first-degree murder, and sentenced to 
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, this sentence fails to 
vindicate a substantial federal interest. 
The suggestion that there are crimes for which death is the only 
appropriate punishment is manifestly out of step with modern death penalty 
jurisprudence.  Taken together, Furman and Gregg require that the death 
penalty be imposed only under a statutory scheme that rationally narrows 
the class of death-eligible defendants and permits a jury to render a 
reasoned, individualized sentencing determination based on a death-eligible 
defendant’s record, personal characteristics, and circumstances of the 
crime.256  It seems strange to posit that a federal interest may only be 
 
251 It is the policy of Kamala Harris, District Attorney of San Francisco, not to seek the 
death penalty even when it is available.  See Egelko, supra note 20. 
252 USAM, supra note 29, § 9-10.090. 
253 Id. § 9-10.090(C) (emphasis added). 
254 Id. § 9-2.031 (A). 
255 Id. § 9-2.031 (D) (emphasis added). 
256 See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (ruling that the legislature 
may not make the death penalty mandatory punishment for certain offenses). 
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vindicated by a specific outcome when that outcome cannot be guaranteed 
even in a federal prosecution.  A death sentence “is the one punishment that 
cannot be prescribed by a rule of law” but is instead a moral judgment of 
the community as to whether “an individual has lost his moral entitlement 
to live.”257 
It may be argued that the outcome sought by the federal government is 
not a sentence of death, but the signaling effect of a capital charge.  Thus, a 
federal interest may not be vindicated when a local prosecutor declines to 
charge a case capitally despite the availability of the death penalty.  This 
rationale is belied in practice, however, by instances in which the federal 
government has found the criterion articulated under the Petite Policy to 
have been met even after the state sought a death sentence.258 
C.  THE FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY AND THE ROLE OF THE CAPITAL 
JURY 
The Sixth Amendment evinces the fundamental nature of the role that 
the jury plays in criminal trials.259  Nowhere is that role more profound than 
in a capital trial, where the jury is called upon to decide between life and 
death.  The Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence has accorded 
constitutional significance to the flexibility of a jury to consider a 
defendant’s individual characteristics260 and to render a decision that is 
essentially a moral one.261 
If in fact the federal interest is lacking, and the crime is essentially a 
local one that happens to have been charged in federal court, then perhaps 
the relevant community values to be exercised are local, rather than federal.  
This position was taken by Judge Calabresi, who, in the case of Donald 
Fell, urged the Second Circuit to consider whether the vicinage requirement 
of the Sixth Amendment mandates a different jury selection procedure in 
federal capital cases arising in a state that does not itself have the death 
 
257 Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468-69 (1984). 
258 See supra notes 60-87 and accompanying text (examples of Petite Policy cases). 
259 Accord Laura G. Dooley, The Dilution Effect: Federalization, Fair Cross-Sections, 
and the Concept of Community, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 79 (2004).  Dooley describes the jury as 
“[t]he quintessential distinguishing feature of the American criminal justice system,” and as 
“perform[ing] the interrelated functions in criminal trials of rendering verdicts that reflect a 
sense of community justice and giving normative content to law.”  Id. at 79. 
260 The Supreme Court’s rulings in Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), 
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), 
mandate that capital juries are entitled to consider a range of mitigating evidence. 
261 See Jeffrey Abramson, Death-Is-Different Jurisprudence and the Role of the Capital 
Jury, 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 117, 120 (2004) (“[A]s to any particular case, the law still does 
and must leave the death sentencing authority free to exercise discretionary moral judgment 
and to bear the responsibility for the fairness of the exercise.”).  
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penalty.262  Reasoning that the vicinage requirement embodies a 
determination by the Framers of the necessity of the jury in maintaining 
local values in our federal system and in capital sentencing proceedings, 
Judge Calabresi concluded that “[t]he relevant community values in the 
instant case are constitutionally defined as those of Vermont.”263  He 
questioned whether the normal rule of capital jury selection, which 
eliminates from jury pools those jurors with categorical opposition to the 
death penalty, adequately addresses the fundamental constitutional values at 
stake.264  Judge Calabresi also questioned whether the imposition of a 
federal capital sentence “in situations that involve predominately local 
crimes in non-death penalty states may be sufficiently rare as to be 
constitutionally prohibited” under the Eighth Amendment.265  Although the 
circuit declined to rehear the case on the grounds identified by Judge 
Calabresi, his questions identify poignant and perplexing issues.  To further 
quote Judge Calabresi, 
In cases from states without the death penalty, the constitutionally salient values are 
not just the “local” values, like the existence of substantial generalized opposition to 
capital punishment, but much more fundamentally the value and endurance of 
federalism itself—the recognition that we are part of a country, of a polity, that has to 
live with both Texan values and Northeastern values.266 
Local juries are undermined in another significant way by this 
application of the federal death penalty.  A state capital prosecution that 
results in a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole 
amounts to an exercise of mercy by a local jury.  However, that mercy can 
be effectively trumped by a successive federal prosecution in which the 
death penalty is sought.  Such a successive prosecution presents questions 
of fundamental fairness to the individual defendant,267 and it is also 
troubling in its effects on the jury system as a whole.  The Supreme Court 
 
262 See United States v. Fell, 571 F.3d 264, 283-86 (2d Cir. 2009) (Calabresi, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
263 Id. at 284. 
264 Id. (“For a federalism like ours—made up as it is of states whose populations hold 
widely different moral viewpoints—to work, perhaps even to survive, it is at least arguable 
that the values of the citizens of the state in question—not just a minority of them—be 
reflected in trial juries, even in federal cases.”). 
265 Id. at 289-90. 
266 Id. at 289. 
267 See supra notes 105-19 and accompanying text.  The nature of capital sentencing by a 
jury means that, even at the local level, a differently composed jury could reach a death 
verdict where another local jury selects life imprisonment as the appropriate punishment.  
The state would never be able to have a second chance at a death verdict, though, and it is 
only under cover of a formalistic reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause that the federal 
government is able to seek death after a state jury has essentially acquitted that defendant of 
the death penalty in relation to the same underlying offense.  
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has held that “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on 
a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the 
responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s death 
rests elsewhere.”268  In Caldwell v. Mississippi, the jury was told that its 
decision was essentially not final, because it would be subject to automatic 
review by the state supreme court.269  The resulting death sentence was 
deemed “simply not represent[ative of] a decision that the State had 
demonstrated the appropriateness of the defendant’s death.”270  The risk in 
Caldwell was that the jury might render a death sentence with the 
impression that appellate review could always reduce the sentence to life, 
and thus the perceived lack of finality of the jury decision prejudiced the 
defendant.271  Instances of dual prosecution by federal and state authorities 
may similarly prejudice the capital defendant.  Although awareness by the 
jury of the potential for successive federal prosecution could influence that 
jury to select life imprisonment because a second jury is available if the 
death sentence is truly appropriate,272 it is also possible that the first jury, in 
an effort to protect its verdict, might select a death sentence.  The 
impression of finality is eroded when a successive federal prosecution may 
essentially appeal, repeal, or overturn an exercise of mercy by a 
local jury. 
VI.  PRESCRIPTION—FEDERAL ENACTMENT OF A ROBUST PETITE POLICY 
In its present configuration, the federal death penalty has far-reaching 
implications for individual defendants and for states as sovereign entities 
accountable to their respective citizens.  Although cooperation between 
federal and state law enforcement entities is desirable on the whole, 
constitutional doctrines have not kept pace with the modern reality, in 
which federal and state authorities routinely cooperate.  Rather, the 
constitutional doctrines protect against state obstructionism, and therefore 
 
268 Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 328-29 (1985). 
269 Id. at 325-26. 
270 Id. at 332. 
271 Id. at 332-34. 
272 In Caldwell, Justice Marshall reasoned that jurors might seize upon any suggestion 
that the ultimate burden of deciding a human’s fate does not rest fully on their shoulders 
alone as 
highly attractive.  A capital sentencing jury is made up of individuals placed in a very unfamiliar 
situation and called on to make a very difficult and uncomfortable choice.  They are confronted 
with evidence and argument on the issue of whether another should die, and they are asked to 
decide that issue on behalf of the community. 
Id. at 332-33. 
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do not provide adequate protection for individual defendants faced with 
successive federal prosecution. 
But moreover, the presence of potential federal capital prosecution 
threatens to undermine the decisions of state and local actors with respect to 
the death penalty.  In jurisdictions where the death penalty is unavailable by 
legislative decree, this may result in local prosecutors seeking an end-run 
around state law by actively seeking transfer of the case to the federal 
system.  In other instances, local prosecutors may seek to have a case 
prosecuted by federal authorities in order to increase the odds of achieving a 
death sentence, either because federal authorities will seek death whereas 
the local prosecutor would not, or because the federal jury might be less 
favorable to the defendant.  At the most extreme, a federal capital 
prosecution might be initiated as a rebuke to a local jury that selected life 
imprisonment over the penalty of death. 
Although the number of federal capital prosecutions is still fairly small 
in proportion to the number of state murder prosecutions, there are several 
reasons to think that the problems highlighted in this article may increase 
over time.  First, as described in Section IV.C, states are currently 
undergoing a reexamination of the death penalty.  It is possible that states 
may follow New Jersey and New Mexico in eliminating the death penalty 
altogether.  The difference between state and federal death penalty policy is 
at its most extreme—and the effect of the federal death penalty most 
subversive—in states in which the death penalty has been legislatively 
abolished.  Second, as awareness of the federal death penalty’s presence 
grows, criminal defendants and state juries may alter their behavior.  A 
local jury may be undermined in its sense of finality when making life-or-
death decisions.  Criminal defendants may be hesitant to strike deals with 
state prosecutors, knowing that the agreed-upon sentence may be trumped 
by an ensuing federal prosecution.  What began as collaboration may end 
up having a deleterious effect on the ability of state law enforcement actors 
to induce cooperation on the part of criminal defendants. 
A judicial solution is unavailing.  The formalism of the doctrines 
discussed is deeply entrenched.  Although general Eighth Amendment 
principles favor a recalibration of the doctrines in relation to capital cases, 
in practice the line between a federal prosecution that truly vindicates a 
federal interest and one that is merely a second bite at the apple or an 
instance of forum-shopping for a death verdict is difficult to ascertain.  At 
first blush, it may seem that distinctions may be drawn along statutory lines, 
such that certain offenses are deemed always to touch upon core federal 
interests—such as treason and crimes against officers of the United 
States—but one precept of jurisprudence under the Commerce Clause is 
that every federal criminal statute proscribes behavior that in at least some 
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instances will implicate a core federal concern.  The awkward asymmetry 
between this judicial rule, on the one hand, and, on the other, a judicial rule 
under the Eighth Amendment dictating that some statutes do not present a 
sufficiently strong federal interest to carry the death penalty, would be 
great. 
The Supremacy Clause militates that this problem can only be dealt 
with at the federal level.  In many respects, this highlights the problem for 
the states, as the federal government has not demonstrated the capacity for 
restraint in this area.  Federal criminal law is expansive, and there is little 
reason for Congress to refrain from encroaching on areas of traditional state 
concern.  The Department of Justice’s internal policies recognize the 
potential for encroachment, but they resort to vague and ill-defined terms 
such as “substantial federal interest.”273  In practice, the standards are 
malleable and subject to the interpretation of prosecutors in the field. 
If one accepts, as argued in Part IV, that states are better at capital 
policymaking than is the federal government, then the problem becomes 
how to allow the federal government sufficient room to vindicate its 
interests without unduly interfering with state policymaking and political 
accountability.  One possible solution is for Congress to enact the substance 
of Petite Policy as law in relation to all first-degree murder cases.  In effect, 
then, the federal government would be prevented from undertaking or 
continuing first-degree murder prosecution once a prosecution under state 
law arising out of the same act has been initiated.  By situating the 
instigation of a state prosecution as the triggering point of this federal law, 
the focus is drawn away from the results of the state proceeding, and the 
question of whether a state sentence is sufficiently punitive to vindicate 
federal interests is avoided. 
Whereas blanket application of such a restraint in relation to all federal 
criminal law would not be desirable, its application in the context of 
homicide is less troubling for several reasons.  First, current practice 
indicates that the states are vigorous in enforcing their proscriptions on 
human-on-human violence.  As states are viewed by citizens as the first line 
of defense against street crime, political incentives exist for this practice to 
continue.  There exists no potential for state obstruction in this arena, for 
similar reasons. 
Congress has already incorporated similar restraints into federal 
criminal law in several instances.  For example, 18 U.S.C. § 659, which 
proscribes stealing or tampering with goods in interstate or foreign 
shipments, provides that “[a] judgment of conviction or acquittal on the 
merits under the laws of any State shall be a bar to any prosecution under 
 
273 USAM, supra note 29, § 9-10.050.  
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this section for the same act or acts.”274  The material differences between 
the proposed capital-specific restraint and this statute is that the latter 
nominally creates a race to judgment: until such time as the state proceeding 
reaches a conclusion, a federal prosecution based on the same acts may 
proceed.  The language of the current, non-binding Petite Policy goes 
further, in that it bars “the initiation or continuation of a federal 
prosecution, following a prior state or federal prosecution based on 
substantially the same act(s) or transaction(s).”275  Such a broadly written 
prohibition, statutorily adopted, would prevent the situations faced by the 
Carpenter brothers, who faced simultaneous federal and state capital 
prosecutions for the same acts, as well as the scenario faced by Samuel 
Ealy, who was prosecuted federally following a state court acquittal after 
key evidence was suppressed.  From a policy standpoint, proscription of the 
former scenario avoids the inefficiencies of duplicative prosecutions, and 
avoidance of the latter scenario prevents the diminishment of state courts as 
a result of federal relitigation of their evidentiary rulings. 
However, adoption of the Petite Policy, absent exceptions for 
“unvindicated federal interests”276 resulting from the outcomes of state 
proceedings, would give state courts the ability to exercise an effective veto 
over federal prosecutions.  As explained above, as a general matter the 
abiding interest of the states in effectively and promptly bringing murder 
prosecutions would obviate most of the risk associated with allowing for 
this type of state dominance.  However, there may be scenarios in which the 
murder at issue represents a transgression of the sovereign interests of the 
United States in a manner such that a federal prosecution is appropriate and 
necessary.  It remains true that “only the federal government can vindicate 
truly national interests,”277 and when the federal government moves to 
prosecute, for example, those responsible for the bombing of the federal 
building in Oklahoma City, the connection between the prosecuting 
sovereign and the thrust of the criminal act is unambiguous.  Another such 
situation includes a “crime that intrudes upon federal functions, harming 
entities or personnel acting in a federal capacity, or when it addresses 
offenses committed on sites where the federal government has territorial 
responsibility, or when it addresses matters of international crime.”278  The 
problem, however, is how to draw an exception to the statute that is not so 
large as to render it useless as a limitation on the operation of the federal 
death penalty.  Clearly, the line may not be drawn coextensively with the 
 
274 18 U.S.C. § 659 (2008). 
275 USAM, supra note 29, § 9-2.031. 
276 Id. § 9-2.031.A.  
277 ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 15, at 47. 
278 Id. 
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outer parameters of federal power to enact criminal laws.  A better method 
of line drawing is to identify exceptions based on the specific characteristics 
of the offense that make it a crime against the sovereignty of the United 
States.  For example, when the victim is an official of the United States and 
has been targeted in the course of his or her official duties or because of his 
or her specific relation to the United States, the interest of the United States 
in prosecuting the offense is clear.279 
Any difficulty in drawing appropriate exceptions may be softened by 
the fact that a federal prosecution is not proscribed entirely—should the 
state fail to prosecute, the federal government is free to do so.  Similarly, 
the fact that the United States must in some cases exercise restraint in favor 
of state prosecutions does not mean that it cannot devote law enforcement 
or prosecutorial resources in aid of the state proceeding. 
The proposed statutory remedy would not eliminate all unfairness to 
individual defendants because it addresses the federal government only and 
does not place a limit on the ability of a state to undertake a prosecution 
subsequent to a federal prosecution.  The statute and the restraints of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause still allow for this.  However, the institutional 
features of state criminal justice systems give reasons to think that the 
potential for abuse in the dual sovereignty doctrine operates primarily in 
one direction.  Whereas the federal government, which is the less cost-
sensitive actor, might undertake a successive prosecution in order to obtain 
a conviction on the highest possible count or to obtain a death sentence, it is 
more likely that states would decline to follow a federal prosecution even 
though the law allows for them to do so. 
Perhaps a larger concern arises not over the issue of fairness to 
individual defendants, but from a process standpoint.  As discussed, the 
states are currently engaged in a reevaluation of the costs and benefits of 
their capital systems.  Furthermore, public accountability for criminal 
justice policy is greater in the states than at the federal level.  It is possible 
that the least desirable outcome among the many troubling scenarios 
presented in this Article is for the existence of the federal death penalty to 
short-circuit or create an end-run around reasoned and accountable state 
death penalty policy.  This was the case in North Dakota with the Alfonso 
Rodriguez prosecution.  It is important to note, though, that under the 
proposed statutory remedy, this scenario could only take place with 
collusion on the part of state officials to specifically bypass state law in 
order to seek a death sentence.  Authorities in North Dakota, or New Jersey, 
 
279 Accord Gleeson, supra note 37, at 1716 ( “In a federal system that rightly accords 
great deference to states’ prerogatives, the federalization of the death penalty should be 
limited to cases in which there is a heightened and demonstrable federal interest.”). 
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or any other state without the death penalty could effectively prevent a 
federal capital prosecution by initiating a state-level prosecution.  Although 
deliberate bypass of state policies is possible under the proposed remedy, 
the states are not powerless to stop it.  Should state officials request or 
otherwise invite federal prosecution, the existence of the statutory remedy 
would make it clear that the officials affirmatively sought federal 
intervention.  This brings an increased level of transparency to the decision-
making process, and ultimately enhances the accountability of state actors. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The existence of federal criminal jurisdiction within our system of dual 
sovereignty is of special concern in relation to capital punishment.  The 
Eighth Amendment jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has required 
careful procedures by which the discretion and passion of all actors in the 
criminal justice system are channeled.  In spite of these doctrines, the 
presence of dual jurisdiction over a broad range of capital crimes injects 
another opportunity for arbitrariness into the system.  In addition to creating 
the potential for unfairness to individual defendants, the presence of the 
federal death penalty undermines state policymakers at every stage, from 
the drafting of legislation to the charging decisions of local prosecutors, and 
the functioning of capital juries.  This diminishes the capacity of states to 
realize their preferences in relation to criminal justice outcomes in their 
territory.  The states are currently engaged in a reevaluation of their death 
penalty systems, and the presence of the federal death penalty threatens to 
undermine these discussions.  A due regard for the primary role of the states 
in criminal justice administration suggests that federal restraint, in the form 
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